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Summary
Cadmium from phosphate fertilisers poses a potentially serious threat to soil quality and,
through the food chain, to human health. The European Commission is considering the
possibility of using an EU-wide charge on cadmium in fertilisers so as to improve the
competitive position of the ‘low-Cd’ product YLVjYLV the ‘high-Cd’ one. The present
study aims at evaluating the economic and environmental implications of such a charge.
The EU is presently importing almost all of its phosphate rock and a substantial part of
its processed phosphate (phosphoric acid and phosphate fertilisers) from third countries.
There is a tendency for phosphoric acid and fertiliser production to be relocated in phos-
phate rock producing countries (vertical integration). The production capacity of the
phosphate fertiliser industry in the EU has been decreasing substantially in recent years.
Phosphate fertiliser consumption in the EU also shows a downward trend. Since the
peaks of consumption during the1970s and 1980s, a reduction of 45% was recorded, and
further decrease is expected for the future. The average share of fertilisers in total farm-
ing costs is generally around 10% or less.
Sweden is presently the only EU country which applies a charge on cadmium in phos-
phate fertilisers. Several other Member States pursue a cadmium reduction by means of
other policy instruments. A common EU policy on the issue does not (yet) exist.
The cadmium content of phosphate fertilisers can be reduced by using low-Cd phosphate
rock (usually of magmatic origin), or by decadmiation of either phosphate rock or phos-
phoric acid. Using low-Cd rock has been the dominant strategy in countries where cad-
mium reduction policies are being pursued. Decadmiation is currently too expensive and
low-cost technologies are not yet fully developed. In some cases technical restrictions
impede the use of either magmatic rock or decadmiation.
Designing a charge on Cd in P fertilisers implies a number of choices concerning issues
such as the charge base and rate, the earmarking of revenues, degree of harmonisation
and various implementation issues. This study presents six options for a possible EU





Applied in all Member
States at a uniform
charge rate
Applied in all Member
States at charge rates
equal to, or exceeding an
EU wide minimum
Applied in some Mem-
ber States only, with dif-
ferences in charge rates
µ0RGHUDWH¶
YHUVLRQ
Charge rate EUR 0.25
per gramme Cd, initially
applying to fertiliser with
more than 60 mg Cd per
kg P2O5. Threshold
lowered to 40 mg Cd per
kg P2O5 after 2 years and
to 20 mg Cd per kg P2O5
after another 2 years
Minimum charge rate
EUR 0.25 per gramme
Cd; thresholds and
phasing as in Uniform
approach
Charge rates on average
EUR 0.25 per gramme
Cd; thresholds as in Uni-






Charge rate EUR 1.00
per gramme Cd; no
threshold or phasing
Minimum charge rate
EUR 1.00 per gramme
Cd; no threshold or
phasing
Charge rates on average
EUR 1.00 per gramme
Cd; no threshold or
phasing
The main focus of the analysis is on the ‘minimum rate, stringent’ option, which is likely
to have the strongest impact. In the analysis, three scenarios are distinguished:
• µEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶ this scenario (which may prevail in the short term) implies a
lack of impact from the charge on supply and demand. Obviously, this scenario has
no environmental impact and leads to the highest level of charge revenues. It is un-
likely to persist for a long time;
• µUXVKIRUORZ&GSKRVSKDWHURFN¶ in this scenario (which is the most likely scenario
for the medium and possibly also the long term), a massive shift in the use of raw
material takes place. Morocco and other African countries will be replaced by South
Africa and Russia as the EU’s main phosphate suppliers. Low-cadmium phosphate
reserves in these countries are probably sufficient for a long period, although there
may be some technical restrictions on their use. This scenario leads to reductions in
cadmium flows to farmland as well as to a reduction of cadmium in waste gypsum;
• µGHFDGPLDWLRQEUHDNWKURXJK¶ in this scenario (which may occur in the long term if
certain market and technological conditions are fulfilled),  decadmiation technology
is assumed to be used on a large scale. In the ‘stringent’ version of the charge, there
will still be a tendency towards the exclusion of countries producing  phosphate rock
with very high Cd concentrations (such as Senegal and Togo). In the ‘moderate’ ver-
sion, most present suppliers will be able to compete. The cadmium flows to agricul-
tural land will be reduced, but the cadmium content of waste gypsum will not be af-
fected. Moreover, this scenario implies a flow of cadmium in decadmiation waste,
which may cause environmental problems in the producing countries.
The impact of the cadmium charge on agriculture is likely to be limited in all three sce-
narios, as farmers face overall cost increases of less than 1%.
The environmental and economic impacts of the Cd charge are in addition to the changes
which will occur as a result of other developments, e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). Some of these developments will lead to a drop in fertiliser use, thus contributing
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to the decrease in cadmium load to agricultural land. This ‘autonomous’ decrease in
cadmium load is, however, much smaller than the decrease that can be achieved through
the charge.
It should be emphasised that, although the main conclusions are probably quite robust,
quantification of the impact of a cadmium charge is only possible within relatively wide
margins, given the uncertainties regarding a number of variables and assumptions.On the
basis of the analysis, the following suggestions for the possible introduction of an EU wide
Cd charge can be made.
First of all, the ‘ideal’ cadmium charge would have a regionally differentiated rate, because
of the variety in soil quality, sensitivity and background Cd concentrations in the EU. How-
ever, such a charge would be administratively unfeasible. It is therefore suggested to intro-
duce minimum charge rates at the EU level. Member States can choose to increase the rate
depending on the severity of the cadmium problem. This ‘minimum rate’ approach is better
able to reflect the differences of the problem between Member States than a uniform EU-
wide charge.
The levy revenues for each Member State will be relatively low. The aggregate maximum
for the EU as a whole can be roughly estimated at 175 million Euro per year in the ‘Business
as usual’ scenario under the ‘stringent, uniform’ charge option. It will be much less in other
options and under the two other, more likely, scenarios, where cadmium contents are effec-
tively reduced. In principle,  the net revenues of the levy could be recycled to the sector
paying them: industry and the farmers. Industry could be supported by R&D funding for
promising low-Cd fertiliser technologies. If these technologies include decadmiation, special
attention will be needed for the problem of safe disposal of waste products containing cad-
mium. Farmers can receive support through awareness raising and training programmes to
optimise the use of (phosphate) fertilisers. However, since the net revenues are expected to
be low, due to the use of low cadmium fertilisers, it is questionable if such earmarking
makes much sense from an economic point of view. Nevertheless, revenue recycling might
enhance the acceptance of the charge.
Administrative costs should  be minimised. In the ‘uniform’ approach, the charge can be
levied from the relatively small number of producers and importers to the EU market. In the
two other approaches, the number of taxpayers is higher, as the charge has to be levied (and
in some cases reimbursed) on fertilisers traded between Member States as well. Thus, a
compromise will have to be found between low administrative costs and differentiation be-
tween Member States.
Preferably, the introduction of a charge on cadmium should be announced well in advance.
This would enable companies using high cadmium phosphate rock to switch to an alternative
and in this way a situation of comparative disadvantage for these producers could be
avoided. A (probably small) drawback of early announcement is the risk of traders or farm-
ers building up stocks of untaxed high-Cd fertiliser during the intermediate period.
The impact of the charge on North- and Central-African countries mainly exporting high
cadmium phosphate rock to the EU may need to be taken into account. It will be hard for at
least some of these countries to remain competitive under a cadmium charge, even if profit-
able decadmiation technologies become available. Applying a threshold for the cadmium
content (of say 20 mg Cd / kg P2O5) below which no charge is due could be helpful in this
case (although a threshold is environmentally less advisable, because it removes the incen-
tive for continued Cd reduction). However, under a ‘low-Cd rock’ scenario these countries
YL ,QVWLWXWHIRU(QYLURQPHQWDO6WXGLHV
will need assistance to find other export opportunities. Possible instruments are the EU asso-
ciation treaties (for countries like Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco) and the Lomé Conven-
tion (for countries like Senegal, Togo and Nauru).
Finally, a cadmium charge implies the need to introduce a labelling system for P fertilis-
ers, specifying their cadmium content. Such a system might be introduced anyway, re-
gardless of the possible introduction of a charge. This would make farmers more aware
of the amount of cadmium they put on their land, which in itself could already create a
demand for low-Cd fertiliser.
The overall conclusion of the report is thus that an EU wide charge would in most op-
tions analysed have the effect of an increase in the demand for low-cadmium raw mate-
rial for the production of phosphate fertilisers for the EU market. The effects on the pro-
ducers of fertilisers would be limited if they were given sufficient time to prepare for the
charge. The effects on EU farmers would be small. The economic effects on some raw
material and fertiliser producer countries outside the EU could be significant.
The amount of cadmium put on EU soil would be considerably reduced. The cost-
efficiency would be high as large reserves of low-Cd rock are probably available at lim-
ited extra cost, and this rock can in most cases be used after a limited investment in up-
dating production facilities. In case of a breakthrough for decadmiation technologies, a
waste problem in the form of cadmium would occur in the fertiliser producing countries
with high Cd content in their raw material.
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1. Introduction
Cadmium from phosphate fertilisers poses a potentially serious threat to soil quality and,
through the food chain, to human health. The exact size of the problem is hard to deter-
mine, due to a lack of sufficient and reliable data (ERM, 1997). The risks caused by
various sources of cadmium are currently subject to a comprehensive risk assessment
within the framework of EU Regulation 793/93. However, it is obvious that in the long
term the continuing input of cadmium to agricultural soils through fertilisers could lead
to accumulation beyond acceptable levels. While there are other important sources of
soil contamination with cadmium as well (e.g. manure, compost, sewage sludge and at-
mospheric deposition)1, phosphate fertilisers are generally the most important one as far
as farmland is concerned.
Apart from reducing fertiliser use, lowering the cadmium content in fertilisers is the only
feasible way of reducing the cadmium input to farmland from this source. This can be
achieved either by using raw materials (phosphate rock) with a lower cadmium content,
or by eliminating the cadmium from the phosphate rock or the phosphoric acid during
the production process.
Currently, no uniform EU standard for the maximum allowable cadmium content of fer-
tilisers exists. A number of Member States apply their own limit values, which poses re-
strictions on the internal market for fertilisers. There is some debate on the desirability
and level of a harmonised EU wide standard, given the differences in circumstances and
priorities in the various Member States. Meanwhile, it is widely acknowledged that a re-
duction in cadmium content is in general desirable and achievable at reasonable cost.
The European Commission is considering the possibility of using an EU-wide charge on
cadmium in fertilisers so as to improve the competitive position of the ‘low-Cd’ product
YLVjYLV the ‘high-Cd’ one. Such a charge would encourage farmers to use the low-Cd
alternatives, and stimulate suppliers to invest in technologies for producing them. In ad-
dition to this direct environmental impact, indirect effects may result, both positive (e.g.
lower amounts of fertiliser applied in the EU due to the price increases) and negative
(e.g. a relative increase in the use of high-Cd fertiliser outside the EU). Moreover, a
charge on Cd in fertilisers would have a range of economic implications for supplier
countries and companies and for agriculture. Therefore, the Commission initiated a study
on the various aspects of a Cd charge.
The objectives of the present study are:
• to evaluate the economic and environmental implications of an EU wide charge on
the content of cadmium in mineral fertilisers; and
• to evaluate the possibility and effects of an EU wide framework for charges, within
which each Member State could set its own rate.
                                                  
1 In addition to these, there are other sources of environmental pollution with cadmium, such
as the disposal of batteries containing cadmium. However, these “point sources” are gener-
ally less relevant for the contamination of farmland with cadmium. Appendix II contains a
comparison of the different sources of cadmium pollution, abatement costs and charge levels.
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This report, which presents the key findings of the research undertaken, is structured as
follows. Chapter 2 contains a survey of the EU phosphate fertiliser market. It identifies
the main producers and users of phosphate rock, phosphoric acid and phosphorus fertil-
isers, and their relevance to the EU. Trends in production and trade are also described. In
chapter 3, policies and technical options to reduce the cadmium content of P fertilisers
are discussed. Chapter 4 presents some alternative options for the design of an EU wide
charge on cadmium in fertilisers. The possible economic and environmental impacts of
these options are analysed in chapter 5. This analysis is done by means of three scenar-
ios, describing the possible reactions from the fertiliser industry. Chapter 6 presents con-
clusions and policy recommendations.
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2. The phosphate fertiliser market: status and trends
3KRVSKDWHIHUWLOLVHUSURGXFWLRQDQGWUDGH
The production of phosphate rock, the main raw material for phosphate fertiliser, is in-
significant in the EU. Presently, the only Member State producing it is Finland (about
0.2 Mtonnes P2O5 per year (ERM, 1997)). Phosphate rock is being imported from vari-
ous sources around the world, Morocco being the single largest supplying country (see
Table 2.1). Some developing countries, such as Togo, Jordan and Morocco, depend
heavily (30-50%) on phosphate rock for their export earnings (ERM, 1997).
7DEOH ,PSRUWVRISKRVSKDWHURFNWR(80HPEHU6WDWHVE\FRXQWU\RIRULJLQ
WRQQHVRISURGXFWV
USA FSU* Morocco Algeria Tunisia Jordan Israel Togo RSA** Other
Austria - - 65.2 4.8 12.8 20.5 10.3 - - 48.0
Belgium 190.8 158.4 514.2 20.5 17.6 - - - 629.1 -
Denmark - 67.3 6.4 11.8 - 5.5 - - 15.5 33.0
Finland - 91.3 - - - - - - - -
France - 16.9 212.7 110.9 196.5 - 646.3 103.3 - 199.9
Germany 78.7 22.2 66.4 - - 67.5 14.6 - - -
Greece - - 19.3 91.4 5.3 155.4 - 75.9 - 131.1
Ireland 0.4 - 10.0 - - - - - - -
Italy - - 202.7 - 3.0 - 13.8 - - 44.0
Netherl. 269.0 483.6 276.2 - - 447.6 290.1 - 20.9 88.0
Portugal - - 6.0 - 22.9 - - - - 128.0
Spain - - 1,624.4 13.2 18.2 - - 54.3 - 49.0
Sweden - - 70.5 - - - - - - 5.0
UK - 11.9 8.2 10.4 - - - - - -
7RWDO(8          
* Former Soviet Union ** Republic of South-Africa
Source: ERM (1997)
The EU is presently a net importer of processed P2O5. More than 2.5 million tonnes of
phosphoric acid and phosphate fertilisers are being imported annually (the latter mainly
in the form of ammonium phosphate), the major suppliers being Russia, Morocco and
Tunisia (see Table 2.2). EU exports are primarily in the form of NPKs (fertilisers con-





USA FSU* Morocco Tunisia Israel Senegal RSA** Other Intra-EU
Austria - - 1.9 - - - - - -
Belgium 9.3 94.3 215.3 - - - - 14.9 7.7
Denmark - 14.9 - - - - - - 41.5
Finland - - - - - - - - -
France 39.9 87.3 230.7 177.8 38.3 1.6 17.9 31.0 119.5
Germany 36.7 97.6 27.0 - 5.8 - 48.4 15.0 112.5
Greece - - - 4.4 - - - 2.3 -
Ireland - 2.6 83.4 74.1 - - - 7.0 1.5
Italy - 213.2 124.7 168.2 37.1 2.6 - 3.2 12.7
Netherl. - 36.3 14.2 - 82.0 - 8.5 - 63.5
Portugal - 12.9 27.3 - - - - - 9.2
Spain - 52.2 83.3 24.9 10.5 - - 12.1 12.4
Sweden - - - - - - - - 5.0
UK - 109.3 266.8 - 53.6 - - 3.6 68.7
7RWDO(8    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* Former Soviet Union ** Republic of South-Africa
Source: ERM (1997)
France, the Netherlands and Spain are the largest phosphate fertiliser producing coun-
tries of the EU. Together they account for almost half of total EU production capacity
(EC, 1997). Table 2.3 gives the figures for production, consumption and international
trade of phosphate fertilisers by EU Member State.
Figure 2.1 shows the development of the EU-15’s phosphate trade over the period 1985-
1995. The general decline in phosphate use is clearly reflected, as is the tendency (espe-
cially since 1990) towards less imports of raw materials and more imports of intermedi-
ate and final products.
The main competitive advantages of the EU fertiliser industry are its modern technology,
high energy efficiency and skilled labour, as well as its location close to its customers in
combination with a well developed system of marketing, distribution and logistics. On
the other hand, the industry faces relatively high energy costs and strict health, environ-
ment and safety regulations, which also affect its cost structure negatively. Overcapacity
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union has led to fierce com-
petition from those countries on the EU market. In a number of cases (all relating to ni-
trogen fertilisers) anti-dumping measures have been taken (EFMA, 1997a). Competition
from other regions, like North Africa, the Arabian Gulf and Asia, is also growing. Tariffs
on fertiliser products are to be progressively reduced: the maximum rate will decrease
from 10.6% in 1995 to 6.5% in 2004. Many developing countries, and also the CEE
countries can already export duty free to the EU, whereas exports to CEE countries are




Country Production Import Export Consumption
Austria 52.0 22.0 16.0 56.0
Belgium 152.0 181.0 282.0 51.0
Denmark 58.0 35.0 45.0 48.0
Finland 109.0 0.0 51.0 58.0
France 558.0 511.3 58.7 1051.9
Germany 160.0 356.0 97.0 415.0
Greece 133.0 32.0 33.0 132.0
Ireland 0.0 117.0 0.0 129.0
Italy 256.0 502.0 6.0 539.0
Netherlands 363.0 109.0 411.0 61.0
Portugal 56.0 30.0 10.0 76.0
Spain 337.0 277.0 60.0 554.0
Sweden 14.0 31.0 0.0 45.0
UK 93.0 356.0 47.0 402.0
Total EU 2341.0 2559.3 1116.7 3617.9




























Fertiliser manufacturing in the EU can be characterised as a capital intensive industry,
which is dominated by a limited number of large companies (Norsk Hydro and Kemira
being the largest ones). Having undergone major restructuring in the early 1990s, which
led to a substantial reduction in production capacity and employment, the EU fertiliser
industry is now regarded as viable and internationally competitive, although profitability
remains modest. In some EU countries, the restructuring process is still going on.
Bartzokas and Yarime (1999) distinguish three types of corporate strategies in the re-
structuring process of the European fertiliser industry:
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• H[LW: a strategy followed by firms like ICI, Hoechst and Enichem. They have decided
that their core competence is not in the sectors based on the availability of cheap
natural resources, and have chosen a strategy of moving away from bulk chemicals
to fine and specialty chemicals;
• UHJLRQDORULHQWDWLRQ: companies which are following this strategy include Agrolinz,
BASF, DSM, Grande Paroisse, IFI and Fertiberia2. Their strategy is basically to se-
cure their own markets in Europe. Close relationship with local farmers is very im-
portant for pursuing this strategy;
• JOREDOH[SDQVLRQ: Norsk Hydro and Kemira have decided to go beyond the Euro-
pean markets. These firms are pursuing vertical integration and have started to make
foreign direct investment in the upstream segment for the access to cheap raw mate-
rials, including phosphate rock. They are also moving to production in high-demand
developing countries, such as South Asia and China.
The demand for phosphate fertiliser in the EU-15 is expected to decrease further, as a re-
sult of changes in crop (and fallow) areas (on which the CAP reform has a major influ-
ence), new crop varieties, improvements in nutrient management and application tech-
nology, environmental regulations, and substitution by manures and slurries. EFMA ex-
pects a 10% drop in P fertiliser use over the period 1999-2009 (EFMA, 1999).
On the world market, however, demand for fertilisers is expected to grow. According to
the FAO, fertiliser consumption in developing countries will increase at an annual rate of
3.8% until 2010 (EC, 1997). New projects that are scheduled to start by 2003 in Austra-
lia, Canada, China, India, Jordan, and Morocco are expected to increase world phosphate
rock and phosphoric acid production capacities by 10%. Expansions in phosphoric acid
and fertiliser production capacity planned beyond 2003 will be located near phosphate
rock mines to reduce costs and avoid transportation or other disruptions to supply (Jasin-
ski, 1998). The trend for new phosphoric acid plants to be situated at or near the location
of a phosphate rock mine is also stimulated by the complications for the production pro-
cess caused by differences in phosphate rock qualities (IFA/UNEP, 1998).
3KRVSKDWHIHUWLOLVHUXVH
The use of phosphate fertilisers in the EU and the share of fertiliser costs in the total cost
of three types of farms in the 15 EU countries is discussed in this section.
Total consumption of phosphate fertilisers in Western Europe in 1996/97 is assessed at a
level of some 3,600 Kt P2O5 (EFMA, 1997b). This is slightly more than 10% of total
world consumption. Since the peaks of consumption during the1970s and 1980s, phos-
phate fertiliser use in the EU has been reduced dramatically by some 45% (EFMA,
1998a). An important reason for this is the transition from an ‘enrichment phase’, in
which the phosphorus status of soils is improved, to a ‘replacement phase’, in which the
amount of phosphorus added to the soil is about the same as the amount harvested with
the crops (Bertilsson, 1996). Other factors behind the reduction in P fertiliser use are re-
placement by organic nutrients and the more efficient use of nutrients, which has al-
lowed yields to increase without a corresponding increase in chemical inputs.
                                                  
2 However, DSM and ICI do not produce phosphate fertilisers anymore.
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During the past couple of years, figures on total consumption in the EU have been rela-
tively stable. Differences across countries and crops are large (Table 2.4). Average con-
sumption of phosphate fertilisers for growing cereals in the EU is relatively high (about
44 kg/ha) and well above that of permanent crops and permanent grassland.
7DEOH 3KRVSKDWHDSSOLFDWLRQNJ32SHUKHFWDUHE\FRXQWU\DQGFURS
Country Total cereals Permanent crops Permanent grassland
Belgium/Luxembourg 20 30 33
Denmark 19 - 14
France 47 12 26
Germany 31 28 7
Greece 25 37 -
Ireland 60 - 17
Italy 75 40 2
Netherlands 13 38 17
Portugal 51 25 2
Spain 50 20 2
United Kingdom 51 25 12
Austria 35 18 4
Finland 24 50 25
Sweden 16 - 13
EUR-15 44 26 11
Source: EFMA
The impact of a charge on cadmium in phosphate fertilisers on agriculture would largely
depend on the share of the costs of such nutrients in total costs. The incentive to apply
phosphate fertilisers with lower cadmium content is likely to be highest where costs of
such phosphates are a considerable part of total costs of input. In light of this sensitivity
we provide some figures indicating the significance of fertiliser costs in the EU. Detailed
information regarding the expenses on mineral fertilisers at farm level is available from
the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) of the Commission of the European
Communities. FADN contains farm level data on the structure of the farm level (eco-
nomic size, agricultural area and livestock population), total output, intermediate con-
sumption, a balance sheet account and a profit and loss account. The sample includes
approximately 60,000 holdings, which are stratified according to region, economic size
and farming type.
Figures on the costs of fertilisers3 and soil improvers are presented for three farming
types, i.e. specialist cereals, specialist horticulture, and specialist fruit and citrus fruit.
Table 2.5 shows the distribution of represented holdings by share of fertilisers and soil
improvers in total costs on specialist cereals. Similar figures for the two other farming
types are presented in Table 2.6 (specialist horticulture) and Table 2.7 (specialist fruit
and citrus fruit).  Similar maps on the costs of fertilisers and soil improvers are also pre-
sented in Appendix III of this report. Map A.3.1 shows the costs of fertilisers and soil
improvers per hectare of Utilised Agricultural Area (ECU) on specialist cereals in the
                                                  
3 These figures relate to total fertiliser use, not only phosphate fertiliser.
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EU. Similar figures for the two other farming types are presented in Map A.3.3 (special-
ist horticulture) and Map A.3.5 (specialist fruit and citrus fruit).
Map A.3.2 shows the share of fertilisers and soil improvers in total costs (%) on special-
ist cereals in the EU. Similar figures for the two other farming types are presented in
Map A.3.4 (specialist horticulture) and Map A.3.6 (specialist fruit and citrus fruit).
Figure A.3.1 shows the share of fertilisers and soil improvers in total costs of specialist
cereals. Similar figures for the two other farming types are presented in Figure A.3.2
(specialist horticulture) and Figure A.3.3 (specialist fruit and citrus fruit).
Specialist cereals
The costs of fertilisers and soil improvers on specialist cereals exceed 125 ECU per hectare
of utilised agricultural area in parts of Germany, France, Italy, Sweden, Greece and Portugal.
These costs on average are below 100 ECU. In contrast to the expenses of fertilisers in the
horticulture sector, in specialist cereals the costs are relatively small on a per hectare basis.
The expenses however are a substantial share of total costs. On average, they are 12%.
A wide variation exists across the group of holdings with lowest shares relative to the group
of holdings with highest shares. Group ‘low’ is 6% in Denmark, whereas it is 15% in group
‘high’ (Table 2.5). Italy has more than 70 thousand specialist cereals holdings. In this coun-
try the share is 20% on about a third of these holdings. There the incentive to achieve a re-
duction on the expenses of phosphate fertilisers is likely to be highest in regions where costs
of fertilisers are a considerable part of the total costs of input.
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Low Medium High Total Total
Denmark 6 10 15 10 9.5
Germany 5 9 14 9 8.0
Greece 9 16 23 15 17.7
Spain 10 18 29 19 46.7
France 8 13 18 13 33.2
Ireland . . . 19 1.2
Italy 7 12 20 13 71.2
Portugal 4 10 19 11 4.1
Finland . . . 17 3.0
Sweden 4 12 20 11 6.1
United Kingdom 7 11 15 10 9.4
a) Distribution of represented holdings by share of fertilizers and soil improvers in total costs.
Source: FADN-CCE-DG Agriculture/A-3; adaptation LEI.
Specialist horticulture
The costs of fertilisers and soil improvers on specialist horticulture are far above those in
specialist cereals. On average they amount to 1,400 ECU per hectare, and exceed 2,500
ECU per hectare in parts of Germany (Schleswig-Holstein, Baden-Württemberg) and
France (Rhone-Alpes), Belgium and the Netherlands.
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The share of fertilisers and soil improvers in total costs on average is 5%. A wide varia-
tion exists across the group of holdings with lowest shares relative to the group of hold-
ings with highest shares. Group ‘low’ is 7% in Spain, whereas it is 22% in group ‘high’
(Table 2.6). In that country, which has more than 32 thousand specialist horticulture
holdings, the share is 22% on about a third of these holdings. There the incentive to
achieve a reduction on the expenses of phosphate fertilisers is likely to be highest in re-
gions where costs of fertilisers are a considerable part of the total costs of input.
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Low Medium High Total Total
Belgium 2 5 16 7 4.6
Denmark 3 4 8 5 1.5
Germany 0 2 5 2 9.4
Greece 4 9 15 8 7.4
Spain 7 15 22 15 32.2
France 3 6 12 6 11.0
Italy 3 9 18 10 21.3
Netherlands 1 2 12 4 14.2
Portugal 3 8 15 8 8.7
United Kingdom 1 4 8 4 4.0
a) Distribution of represented holdings by share of fertilizers and soil improvers in total costs.
Source: FADN-CCE-DG Agriculture/A-3; adaptation LEI.
Specialist fruit and citrus fruit
The costs of fertilisers and soil improvers on specialist fruit and citrus fruit are 130 ECU per
hectare. They exceed 175 ECU per hectare in the southern part of France, parts of Italy and
large areas of Greece.
The share of fertilisers and soil improvers in total costs on average is 6%. A wide variation
exists across the group of holdings with lowest shares relative to the group of holdings with
highest shares. Group ‘low’ is 3% in Italy, whereas it is 20% in group ‘high’ (Table 2.7). In
that country, which has more than 125 thousand specialist fruit and citrus fruit holdings, the
share is 20% on about a third of these holdings. There the incentive to achieve a reduction on
the expenses of phosphate fertilisers is likely to be highest in regions where costs of fertilis-









Low Medium High Total Total
Belgium . . 2 1 1.0
Denmark . . . 2 0.3
Germany 1 1 . 2 1.2
Greece 6 10 15 10 45.9
Spain 7 12 21 13 90.4
France 1 3 7 3 9.2
Italy 3 8 20 9 127.5
Netherlands 1 . 2 1 2.2
Austria . . . 2 1.3
Portugal 1 5 12 6 21.8
United Kingdom . . . 1 0.8
a) Distribution of represented holdings by share of fertilizers and soil improvers in total costs.
Source: FADN-CCE-DG Agriculture/A-3; adaptation LEI.
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3. Reducing cadmium in phosphate fertilisers: options and
costs
&DGPLXPUHGXFWLRQSROLFLHVLQWKH(8DQGLWV0HPEHU6WDWHV
Cadmium in fertilisers has been a long standing concern for EU policy makers. In 1984,
a research programme was started on cadmium removal from phosphate rock and phos-
phoric acid, which was funded successively by the World Bank and the European Com-
mission. In 1988, the Commission adopted a resolution outlining an action programme
for the EU with the aim of reducing the introduction of cadmium in soil from fertiliser
(Mrabet, 1996). The EU has also issued legislation concerning other sources of cadmium
inputs to agricultural soil, notably Directive 86/278/EEC, which gives limit values for
the concentration of cadmium in agricultural soils of 1 to 3 mg/kg (dry matter). Sewage
sludge should not be applied to soils where the cadmium concentrations exceed these
limits.
As yet, however, there are no harmonised EU regulations regarding the cadmium content
of fertilisers. The EU Fertiliser Directive (76/116/EEC) does not refer to cadmium,
whereas the Cadmium Directive (91/338/EEC) deals only with products in which cad-
mium is being applied intentionally. Possible EU initiatives will depend on the outcome
of studies on the risks which cadmium in fertilisers entails. These studies are part of a
comprehensive risk assessment of cadmium, which takes place within the framework of
EU Regulation 793/93 on the evaluation and control of the risks of existing substances.
Meanwhile, an EU Directive (98/97/EC) has been adopted which allows Austria, Finland
and Sweden to maintain their existing national limits on cadmium in fertilisers until the
end of 2001.
In addition to these three, several Member States have national regulations and industry
commitments, which limit the maximum concentration of cadmium in fertilisers, the
yearly amount of cadmium input on agricultural land, and/or the cadmium concentra-
tions in agricultural soils (see Table3.1).
The cadmium content of fertilisers can also be affected indirectly by other regulations,
including those directed at reducing fertiliser use in general, regarding the maximum
cadmium content of food products and the emission limits for cadmium in gypsum from
phosphoric acid production4. The latter influence is, however, not necessarily positive:
such regulations may lead to process changes which reduce the cadmium concentrations
in the gypsum, but increase the cadmium content of the fertiliser. To avoid this, separate
measures (such as the envisaged charge) are needed addressing the cadmium content of
fertilisers.
                                                  
4 Although EU Directive 83/513 on Cadmium (a Daughter Directive to the Framework Direc-
tive 76/464 on the discharge of dangerous substances into the aquatic environment) did not
set limit values for the manufacture of phosphoric acid or fertiliser from phosphate rock,
Member States do have the obligation to fix emission standards for these discharges (Bartzo-
kas and Yarime, 1999).
 ,QVWLWXWHIRU(QYLURQPHQWDO6WXGLHV
7DEOH /LPLWYDOXHVIRUFDGPLXPLQIHUWLOLVHUVDQGVRLOVLQ(80HPEHU6WDWHV
Country Max. concentration of
Cd in fertiliser (mg per
kg P2O5)
Max. amount of Cd input
to agricultural soils
(grammes per ha per year)
Max. conc. of Cd in
agr. soils (mg/kg dry
soil; guidance level)
Austria 75 (since 1994) 10 (1) / 5 (2) 1.0
Belgium/Lux. 90 (10) 150 1.0 – 3.0
Denmark 47 (since 1995) 0.5
Finland 21.5 3 0.5
France




Netherlands (8) 0.5 – 1.0
Portugal 40 – 70 (10)
Spain
Sweden 43 (9) 1.75 (4)
UK 0.15 (5) 3.0 (6)
(1) arable land (20 g over a period of 2 years)
(2) grassland and vegetables (10 g over a period of 2 years)
(3) average over a period of 3 years
(4) average for 7 years; will be lowered to 0.75 g/ha/year as from 2000
(5) with sewage sludge only (average over a period of ten years)
(6) soils with a pH of 5.0 and above, treated with sewage sludge
(7) based on a voluntary agreement between government and industry: all fertilisers should com-
ply with the 90 mg/kg level; 89% of the products with the 70 mg/kg level and 63% with the
40 mg/kg level.
(8) OECD (1994) mentions a limit of 40 mg per kg phosphorous, which would equal 17 mg per
kg P2O5. However, according to a spokesman of the Dutch Fertiliser Producers’ Association
VKP, there is no legal limit to the Cd content in phosphate fertiliser in the Netherlands. In-
stead, a voluntary agreement is in preparation (see below).
(9) a voluntary limit of 21.5 mg/kg P2O5 (50 mg/kg P) has been introduced by the Swedish Farm-
ers’ Regional Selling and Purchasing Association SLR (Drake and Hellstrand, 1998).
(10) Mentioned in OECD (1994); probably not a legal limit.
Sources: OECD (1994); ERM (1997); Ehrenberg (1999); Swedish Government (1985)
The use of economic instruments to reduce the cadmium content of fertilisers is pres-
ently limited to Sweden, where a charge on cadmium in commercial fertiliser exists
since 1994 (see Box 3.1). Other countries, such as France, are considering the possibility
of introducing fertiliser taxes (ENDS 1999a), but cadmium is not included in the envis-
aged tax base.
The input of cadmium to agricultural soils can also be influenced by means of communi-
cative instruments, for instance by information and auditing systems for farmers. Vol-
untary agreements are yet another option. The Dutch government, for example, is pre-
paring an agreement with the phosphate fertiliser industry with a view to achieve a sta-
bilisation of the cadmium input from phosphate fertiliser (Apotheker, 1999). Previous
environmental agreements with two large fertiliser producers in the Netherlands already
contained the stipulation that they would reduce the cadmium content of their phosphate
fertilisers (Smit-Kroes and Valkier, 1988; Smit-Kroes, Pessi and Lens, 1988).
$SRVVLEOH(8ZLGHFKDUJHRQFDGPLXPLQSKRVSKDWHIHUWLOLVHUV 
%R[([SHULHQFHZLWKWKH6ZHGLVKFDGPLXPFKDUJH
Sweden has had environmental charges on nitrogen and phosphorus in commercial fer-
tilisers since 1984. The charge on phosphorus was abolished in January 1994 and re-
placed by a charge on cadmium. An important reason for the introduction of the cad-
mium charge was that it creates an ongoing incentive to reduce the concentrations
(Swedish EPA, 1991). Since November 1994, the charge rate is SEK 30 (EUR 3.3) per
gramme of cadmium if the cadmium content exceeds 5 mg per kg phosphorus (about 2.2
mg Cd per kg P2O5) (Swedish EPA, 1997).
According to the (Swedish) Board of Agriculture the content of cadmium in fertiliser has
gradually fallen from 35-40 mg Cd per kg phosphorus (before the introduction of the
charge) to about 23 mg in 1994/95 and 16 mg in 1995/96. The Board concludes that the
Cd charge in combination with the demand (for a low content of Cd in fertiliser) by the
agricultural sector has kept Cd levels on a low level (Jörnstedt, 1998). Drake and Hell-
strand (1998) conclude that the combination of governmental policy (including the
charge and a standard) and voluntary efforts has been successful in reducing the content
of cadmium in phosphorus fertilisers. However, it was not possible to estimate the rela-
tive importance of the different measures.
State tax gross revenues in 1996 were around 10 million SEK (1 million Euro), and the
administrative costs are estimated to be around 1% of the gross revenues (Drake and
Hellstrand, 1998). The tax is administrated by the National Tax Board, together with the
tax on nitrogen. Importers and producers report quantities and contents every month.The
only control made seems to be ‘tax audits’ (concerning the accounting of the firms in-
volved). In 1999, 25 such audits were performed (corresponding to about one ‘man-
year’). The actual cadmium content of fertilisers is not measured by the authorities.
Some problems with illegal imports by small firms of fertilisers from Poland and the
Baltic states  (probably of Russian origin) are reported (Jörnstedt, 2000).
Section 5.4 in this report contains some information on the impact of the Swedish tax on
agriculture.
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Cadmium occurs naturally as a contaminant in all phosphate rock, but the concentrations
vary considerably, depending on the origin of the material. Igneous rock  or apatite
(found in the former Soviet Union, Finland, South Africa and South America) has low
concentrations of cadmium (often less than 1 mg per kg P2O5). Sedimentary rock, which
accounts for some 85-90% of world production, contains cadmium in concentrations







Kola (Russia) < 13 0.3 0.25
Pharlaborwa (South Africa) < 13 0.1 0.38
6HGLPHQWDU\
Florida (USA) 23 19.8 - 32.7 24
Jordan < 30 12.1 - 28 18
Khouribga (Morocco) 46 17 – 63 55
Syria 52 13 – 46 22
Algeria 60 42 – 62.6
Egypt 74
Bu-Cra (Morocco) 100 101 – 115 97
Nahal Zin (Israel) 100 81 – 112 61
Youssoufia (Morocco) 121 164.7 120
Gafsa (Tunisia) 137 94 173
Togo 162 164 – 179 147
North Carolina (USA) 166 125 120
Taiba (Senegal) 203 165 – 180.6 221
Nauru 243
Sources: (1) Davister (1996); (2) Botschek and Van Balken (1999); (3) Demandt (1999).
In its unprocessed state, rock phosphate is not suitable for direct application, since the
phosphorus it contains is insoluble. Three kinds of acids are used to process the phos-
phate rock (EFMA, 1997a):
• phosphoric acid, producing Triple Super Phosphate (TSP);
• nitric acid, producing Ammonium Phosphate (NP), used in the manufacture of com-
plex fertilisers;
• sulphuric acid, producing either Single Super Phosphate (SSP) or phosphoric acid, an
intermediate product in the production of TSP, Mono- and Di-Ammonium Phosphate
(MAP and DAP) and complex fertilisers. This process leads to gypsum (CaSO4) as a
by-product. The cadmium in the phosphate rock is divided among the phosphoric
acid and the gypsum; the proportions are depending on the exact process conditions.
An alternative to using sulphuric acid to produce phosphoric acid (the ‘wet’ process),  is
the ‘clean’ or ‘thermal’process, in which pure phosphorus is released from the phos-
phate rock by heating it in a reducing environment (CBS, 1993). Phosphoric acid is then
produced from the phosphorus. In this process, almost all cadmium ends up in a waste
product (calcinate); the phosphoric acid will thus hardly contain any cadmium. The
phosphoric acid from this process is used for the production of detergent phosphates, for
metal treatment, as a cleaning agent, and in the food industry.
Substitution of low-Cd phosphate rock for high-Cd phosphate rock has taken place in
some countries recently. In the Netherlands, for instance, this has happened in response
to regulations concerning the maximum emission levels of cadmium in phosphorus gyp-
sum (a waste product from the phosphoric acid production; see above). Many fertiliser
industry representatives, however, argue that a large scale substitution (or blending low-
and high-Cd grades) would not be a feasible strategy, given the limited production ca-
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pacity and reserves of low-Cd phosphate rock (see e.g. OECD, 1996, and Appendix IV
to the present report) . Despite these expert opinions, the available figures on low-Cd
rock reserves (which will be presented in Chapter 5) seem to suggest otherwise.
Obviously, the flow of cadmium to agricultural soils can also be reduced by applying
lower amounts of phosphate fertiliser and/or substituting fertilisers by other products
containing phosphorus, e.g. manure. While this may be a feasible option in certain cases,
it does not take away the need to minimise the amount of cadmium in fertilisers. Moreo-
ver, products such as manure, compost and sewage sludge may also contain substantial
amounts of cadmium and/or other contaminants.
As an alternative to using low-Cd rock, a possible route towards phosphate fertiliser with
a lower cadmium content is the development of commercially viable processes to re-
move cadmium from the phosphate rock or from the phosphoric acid. Several of such
processes are currently under development, but none of them are commercially opera-
tional at the industrial level (except for food grade phosphoric acid).  Table 3.3 gives an
overview of the existing processes.
According to Davister (1996), the co-crystallisation (CC) option seems by far the most
promising for the regular fertiliser grade phosphoric acid. Table 3.3 suggests that it is
also the lowest-cost option5. In the early 1990s, a large R&D project has been carried out
on this technology at CERPHOS (Morocco), with financial support from the European
Commission. Tests on a laboratory scale have been successfully completed and a semi-
industrial pilot was designed. However, in recent years there seems to be a lack of prog-
ress in the further development and application of the CC technology (Van Balken,
1999).
In 1995 it was estimated that it would take 7 to 10 years to bring the facilities for the
most promising processes for removing cadmium from phosphoric acid on line (OECD,
1996). Since then, some delay has apparently occurred in Morocco. However, other pro-
ducers may be ready to adopt decadmiation shortly when the need arises. For example,
Hydro Agri’s Köping plant in Sweden is reported to be able to put a Cd removal process
in action at reasonable cost (Bertilsson, 1999).
                                                  
5 According to Van Balken (1999), the cost estimates in Table 3.3 are still up to date. The cost
figure of 6 USD per tonne for the CC process is reasonably “hard”, but refers to the decadmi-
ation itself only. The additional cost of treating the solid waste containing cadmium is in-
cluded in the 9 USD figure, but this estimate is much more uncertain. Probably, this will also
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* Given the uncertainty margins, the cost estimates given would probably be roughly the same when expressed in euros.
** Further treatment of the residue to obtain Cadmium-metal is possible at a cost.
Sources: OECD (1994), OECD (1996), ERM (1997), Lin and Schorr (1997).
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WPA processes provide the input for about 70% of the world’s P2O5 consumption. Other
parts of the fertiliser industry, not using wet process phosphoric acid, do not currently
have a technological alternative other than the use of low cadmium rock, or blending to
reduce overall concentrations (OECD, 1996).
The market price of phosphoric acid is around USD 400 per tonne P2O5 (OECD, 1996),
and the price of phosphate fertilisers (superphosphate 44-46%; diammonium phosphate)
between USD 250 and 300 per tonne of product (TFI, 1999). Given the cost estimates in
Table 3.3 (ranging between 6 and 32 USD per tonne), it would seem likely that the
maximum cost of decadmiation could be around 10% of the fertiliser production costs.
Langeveld (1999) expects decadmiation to cause an increase of 8 to 10% in the fertiliser
price. Lin and Schorr (1997), however, report an estimated 20% increase in product costs
due to decadmiation in fertiliser plants. Davister (1996) estimates the investment costs
for the CC decadmiation process in the range of 30 per cent of the wet acid plant of the
same capacity and operating costs ranging between 20 and 30 percent of the same.
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4. Options for the design of a cadmium charge
,QVWUXPHQWVXVHGLQHQYLURQPHQWDOSROLF\
Market based instruments for environmental policy are grouped in various ways. In general




• deposit refund systems;
• performance bonds; and
• tax credits / exemptions.
 The product charge is used to increase the price of a less environmentally friendly product
in favour of the environmentally friendly alternative (leaded gasoline) or to finance an envi-
ronmentally friendly disposal scheme of the product charged (cars, refrigerators etc.). The
former is therefore called an incentive charge and the latter a financing charge. The emis-
sions charge is the most well known one: emissions charges are applied to (industrial) emis-
sions to water and air, sometimes to noise as well (aircraft noise). Tradable permits have the
economic advantage that the allocation of emission allowances is determined by market
forces and their marginal abatement costs. In that way it is a much more flexible mechanism
than the individual emission permit. Tradable permits have so far been used in the US under
the acid rain program for trading SO2 allowance certificates and within the EU for trading
milk quota and fish quota. The deposit-refund system is used in case of collection schemes,
to make sure that the product to be recycled will be returned after its use. The system is
used in many countries for bottles and cans. Performance bonds are used as obligatory re-
serves with enterprises earmarked for potential clean up activities in the future when their
commercial activities have ended at the current site (e.g. mining). If no pollution occurs, the
money becomes available to the enterprise. The subsidies in terms of tax credits are used in
many different kinds, such as investments credits (depreciation schemes, profit before tax
credits, etc.) and more advanced ones like the Dutch green investment scheme for private
investors to support environmentally friendly projects with low interest bank loans. The tax
credits differ widely among member states.
 The economic instruments that would apply best in the case of cadmium in fertilisers, are:
• product charges; and/or
• tax credits.
 For emission levies the emissions should be easy to monitor, otherwise the transaction costs
of the levy will be excessive high. In the case of cadmium it is possible to register the emis-
sions to soil, but it requires extensive modelling with many parameters to calculate local ab-
sorption characteristics. So administrative costs mainly impede this option.
 Tradable permits are used under a bubble concept, where emissions in the bubble are not
allowed to exceed a certain maximum. This also requires monitoring of emissions. But
more important is that emissions may vary locally, according to the marginal costs of
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abatement of the different entities and independent from the environmental sensitivity of the
soil.
 Deposit refund systems are not applicable, since there is no recyclable object to return after
use6. Performance bonds could be used in case the fertiliser industry can be made responsi-
ble for environmental impacts of cadmium fertiliser. However, the farmer’s responsibility in
using the fertiliser is much greater than the industry’s.
 The two remaining options, product charges and tax credits could very well qualify. The
product charge could be used to tax the high cadmium fertiliser and make the low cadmium
fertiliser more attractive for farmers to buy. The revenues could be used for different pur-
poses:
• to match the remaining price gap between high and low cadmium fertiliser;
• to subsidise research and use of technologies for the production of low-cadmium fertil-
iser (pilot or proven);
• to give tax credits on the purchase of such low-Cd fertiliser production technology.
The last option shows how the charge revenues could flow back into existing tax crediting
schemes. Usually the revenues of the charge are earmarked for industry or society so that
the impact of the charge is budget neutral.
When designing a levy, the following components should be considered:
• charge base and point of incidence;
• charge rate and implementation scheme;
• earmarking;
• degree of harmonisation;
• implementation criteria.
These issues will be addressed in the following section.
,VVXHVLQGHVLJQLQJDFKDUJH
4.2.1 Charge base and point of incidence
The aim of the levy is to reduce the cadmium content of fertiliser: The most logical charge
base would therefore be a gram of cadmium in fertiliser. Since cadmium appears in all
phosphorus fertilisers, one could also imagine taxing the phosphorus content, but then the
cadmium differentiation between low and high cadmium contents would be much more dif-
ficult to reach administratively.
Since the levy is introduced for environmental reasons, the incentive function of the levy is
the most important, not the financing function. This means that there can be room to intro-
duce an exemption or a zero tariff for fertiliser with low cadmium concentration.
The cadmium charge could be levied at various points in the ‘fertiliser chain’. Levying at
the end of the chain (the farmer) would make it possible to take local conditions into ac-
                                                  
6 Huppes HWDO (1992), however, do propose a deposit-refund system for cadmium, but there re-
funding takes place if materials and waste streams that contain cadmium are disposed of in an
acceptable way, or if cadmium and cadmium containing products are exported.
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count. However, this option would imply a very large number of taxable subjects. It seems
more feasible to impose the charge at the moment when the fertiliser enters the EU market
for the first time. This would involve only the producers and importers of fertiliser. Obvi-
ously, such a common approach is only possible in case of a uniform EU charge. If Member
States apply different charge rates, the charge has to be levied from the producers and im-
porters in each Member State.
Two versions of the charge will be analysed:
1. ‘stringent’: a general levy on cadmium in all fertiliser;
2. ‘moderate’: an initial levy on cadmium in fertiliser that exceeds 60 mg Cd per kg P2O5,
over time narrowing down to 40 and in the end to 20 mg Cd per kg P2O5.
The first alternative is taxing each gram of Cd in fertiliser. In this alternative the producer of
the lowest cadmium fertiliser is rewarded by the lowest charge. The low cadmium fertiliser
will have a higher cost price because of the use of expensive low-Cd rock or decadmiation
techniques, which can (partly or fully) be offset by the charge. For the producers of fertiliser
there is always an incentive to improve and lower the cadmium content until the marginal
costs of reducing more cadmium per kilogram fertiliser are equal to the levy.
The second alternative contains a ‘phasing in’ element and a ‘threshold’ element. The
‘threshold’ element may be attractive for industry, since it offers the possibility of avoiding
the charge if the cadmium content of fertiliser is not exceeding the threshold. The ‘phasing
in’ element is based on two thoughts:
• to make sure that producers will meet a certain standard, government can change the
levy standard and tariff over time; and
• the Porter theory, stating that (under certain circumstances) environmental regulations
do not inevitably hinder competitive advantage against foreign rivals; indeed, they often
enhance it (Porter, 1996)7.
                                                  
7 In Tietenberg and Folmer (1998) three cases are identified by the authors under which the hy-
pothesis is hold to be valid:
a) Enhanced competitiveness of producers of complementary products and services. Producers
that are specialised in products and services that protect the environment, will benefit from
(tighter) environmental regulations;
b) Relatively enhanced competitiveness of regulated firms, also called the "first mover effect":
European companies, in the environmental protection technology sector, can create a relative
advantage over other companies by developing new technologies / products. If the other
countries are to accept stronger environmental regulations, this benefit can be further ex-
ploited.
c) Absolute cost for reduction for the regulated firms. A private firm is forced to take meas-
ures, most of them being low hanging fruits, reducing the firm’s private costs as well as im-
proving its environmental performance.
The idea of establishing a threshold is based on case a). If there is a threshold, European fertil-
iser companies will look for ways of avoiding the tax by producing fertiliser with a cadmium
content below the threshold. They will do so as long as their marginal costs of abatement are
lower than the tax that would otherwise have to be paid. Companies supplying equipment that
reduces the amount of cadmium in fertiliser below the threshold, are challenged to find a techni-
cal solution for this problem, because a market demand for this technology (if reasonably priced)
is shaped.
 ,QVWLWXWHIRU(QYLURQPHQWDO6WXGLHV
The charge starts with a relatively high threshold that is acceptable for industry. By setting
deadlines and stricter thresholds industry has the opportunity to adapt to the new thresholds
for the next phase. In the mean time technological innovation can support this trend.
 The initial limit could be 60 mg Cd per kg P2O5. If tax revenues become less, the limit can
be narrowed to 40 and at a later stage to 20 mg Cd per kg P2O5. Such a phased approach
would benefit industry and would probably have a higher degree of acceptance than an im-
mediate target of 20. Of course the phased approach should be communicated clearly to in-
dustry.
4.2.2 The charge rate
 Most of the cost estimates for the various decadmiation techniques presented in Table 3.3
are around USD 30 per ton P2O5. The estimate for the CC process (Co-crystallisation of
cadmium in CaSO4 anhydrate) is lower (6 USD per tonne), but this is still in an early stage
of development and the cost estimate does not include the cost of disposal of the cadmium
waste. This CC process reduces the Cd content from 75 to 10 mg per kg P2O5. If we err on
the safe side and estimate the cost of this reduction of 65 gramme Cd per tonne P2O5 also at
USD 30, a charge rate of about USD 0.5 (or EUR 0.5) per gramme cadmium would com-
pensate for the additional costs. The assumption here is that the cost estimate covers all
relevant cost differences, including, for instance, the cost of disposing the waste product
(which contains the cadmium).
The environmental impact of cadmium in fertiliser (its uptake in the food chain) depends on
the soil quality where the fertiliser is used. There is a wide variation within the EU in the
sensitivity of soils to cadmium accumulation, as well as in the cadmium levels in agricul-
tural soils (cf. ERM, 1997, Tables 2.13-2.15). From an environmental point of view, the
optimal tax rate would therefore differ by region. In theory farmers in sensitive areas would
pay more for high cadmium content fertiliser use than farmers in other areas. However, a
‘farm-to-farm’ differentiation of the tax rate seems to be unfeasible. Differentiation by
Member State is an alternative, although differences in soil sensitivity and background con-
centrations of cadmium within one Member State can be considerable.
4.2.3 Earmarking
 The purpose of the levy is to promote the use of fertiliser with a low cadmium content. For
the production of low cadmium fertiliser the lowest cost option currently is the purchase of
low cadmium phosphate rock. Within the European Union, the use of low cadmium phos-
phate rock for fertiliser production is increasing. However, it is sometimes suggested that
the available amount of directly suitable low cadmium rock is limited. If that is true, on the
long term new technologies may have to be applied to reduce the cadmium content of phos-
phate fertilisers. Thus earmarking a possible cadmium levy could be used to support R&D
activities and pilot projects to identify less expensive cadmium abatement techniques. Ear-
marked income can flow back to the charged producers in different ways: subsidies or tax
credits are the most used forms. Subsidies could cofinance the purchase of equipment and
effectively lower the price, tax credits could indirectly influence the price of equipment e.g.
by lowering the company's profit before tax by a certain percentage of the investment, by
allowing accelerated depreciation, etc. Such aid would of course have to fulfil Community
state aid rules.
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The charge revenues could also be spent in part on awareness raising activities for farm-
ers.This has in the past turned out to be very effective in optimising fertiliser use.
4.2.4 Degree of harmonisation
 Cadmium standards in EU Member States currently range from 21 to 90 mg Cd/kg P2O5.
From the environmental point of view, the maximum level for cadmium content can differ
since the quality of soil determines the absorption capacity of cadmium and the uptake by
plants. In other words: from an environmental perspective it is not necessary to set an equal
maximum rate for the content of cadmium in fertilisers. The most sensitive soils are located
in Eastern Spain, France, Italy and Greece whereas the least sensitive soils are present in
Belgium, Denmark, Northern Germany, Western Spain, Portugal, and most of UK. How-
ever, from an administrative point of view, setting different thresholds for the cadmium levy
for different regions would be hard to manage and enforce. One solution could be a com-
mon minimum threshold for EU15. For very sensitive areas, governments could decide to
put more stringent standards and in return the fertiliser industry could receive additional
state aid for modifying its decadmiation process, although the administrative feasibility of
this option remains questionable.
4.2.5 Implementation
 General criteria applied to be applied to a levy would be:
• compliance with EU-policy;
• its estimated incentive impact;
• revenues of such a levy in comparison to enforcement and administrative costs;
• equity (on individual farmers and fertiliser industry);
• possibilities for fraud; and
• possible side effects of the levy.
%R[7KH(8
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Currently a Community system of taxation (structure and minimum rates of excise taxes) applies
to mineral oils, alcohol and alcoholic beverages, and manufactured tobacco. Article 3 of Directive
92/12/EEC allows Member States to introduce or maintain taxes which are levied on other prod-
ucts, provided, however, that those taxes do not give rise to border-crossing formalities in trade
between Member States. Directive 92/12/EEC provides a framework for product taxes which are
applied in all EU countries at possibly different rates. It is therefore conceivable that it might be
applied to the envisaged cadmium charge as well.
&RPSOLDQFHZLWK(8SROLF\
The levy needs to be in compliance with EU policy on cadmium and the directive on cad-
mium emissions to water by cadmium processing industries (Directive 83/513/EEC). The
EU Fertilisers Directive (76/116/EEC) could be amended so as to harmonise the classifica-
tion of fertilisers with respect to their cadmium content. An earmarking scheme would also
need to comply with the rules for state aid for environmental protection.
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The demand for phosphate fertiliser has a relatively low price elasticity, and its cadmium
content has no influence on its performance in terms of crop productivity. Therefore, the
price increase caused by the charge is unlikely to have much impact on the total demand for
phosphate fertiliser. Some substitution between the different types (single phosphate and
compound/complex fertilisers) might result from the fact that their cadmium content differs.
However, the main impact of the charge will depend on its influence on the supply of low
cadmium raw material and the development of decadmiation technology,. This issue will be
a key element in the analysis of the impact of the charge (see Chapter 5).
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The Swedish example (cf. Box 3.1) shows that revenues are low, so a combination with an-
other, closely related levy could be a solution (e.g. general fertiliser taxes or charges).
The number of taxpayers influences strongly the complexity and costs of the levying sys-
tem. If the charge is levied from the producer or importer of the fertiliser, this number will
be quite low. A uniform charge in all EU countries will entail the lowest administrative
costs. Nevertheless, any system will involve the need of sample-wise measuring of cad-
mium contents in fertilisers, which requires a careful balancing of accuracy and costs.
,PSDFWRQHTXLW\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The social and economic consequences which the introduction of the charge would have on
the income of individual farmers and the profitability of fertiliser industry will be an im-
portant consideration. Preliminarily, one can expect minor impacts within the EU: for farm-
ers, the charge adds only little to their total costs (see Section 2.2), and industry is likely to
be able to pass the additional cost on to their customers. The strongest impact will probably
be felt by the countries producing high-Cd phosphate rock which are presently strongly de-
pendent on the EU for their export earnings (see below).
3RVVLELOLWLHVIRUIUDXGDQGHYDVLRQ
Depending on the way the charge is implemented, the possibilities for fraud can vary. For
example, if producers and importers of fertiliser have to pay the cadmium charge, the num-
ber of charge payers is very limited (especially in case of an EU-wide, uniform charge) and
easy to control. If distributors pay the cadmium charge, control becomes somewhat more
difficult.
In frontier areas a change in consumers patterns is clearly observed when excise tax rates
differ between the neighbouring countries, since consumers can opt for the cheapest alter-
native. An EU-wide, uniform cadmium charge would have the advantage that there are no
opportunities for individual farmers (or illegal traders) to evade the charge by importing
fertilisers from neigbour EU countries which do not apply the charge (or which apply a
lower rate). However, this kind of tax evasion will probably be limited anyway in the case




If the effect of a cadmium charge would be to limit the import of phosphate only to rock
with a low cadmium content, countries like Jordan, Morocco, Togo, Tunisia and Senegal
would face quite severe economic consequences. For these countries it would be more
beneficial to install decadmiation techniques with the European producers of fertiliser and
keep European borders open for their phosphate ores. Moreover, as some of these countries
have recently invested in their own (export oriented) phosphate fertiliser industries, any EU
policy measures aiming at a reduction of cadmium in fertiliser should take the consequences
for these industries into account as well.
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Based upon the considerations in the preceding sections, three different approaches for the
cadmium charge have been distinguished (‘uniform’, ‘inimum rate’ and ‘divergent’), each
of which can be applied in a ‘moderate’ and a ‘stringent’ version. These six options are
summarised in Table 4.1. In chapter 5, the economic and environmental consequences of







Applied in all Member
States at a uniform charge
rate
Applied in all Member
States at charge rates equal
to, or exceeding an EU
wide minimum
Applied in some Member
States only, with
differences in charge rates
µ0RGHUDWH¶
YHUVLRQ
Charge rate EUR 0.25 per
gramme Cd, initially ap-
plying to fertiliser with
more than 60 mg Cd per kg
P2O5. Threshold lowered to
40 mg Cd per kg P2O5 after
2 years and to 20 mg Cd
per kg P2O5 after another 2
years
Minimum charge rate EUR
0.25 per gramme Cd;
thresholds and phasing as
in Uniform approach
Charge rates on average
EUR 0.25 per gramme Cd;






Charge rate EUR 1.00 per
gramme Cd; no threshold
or phasing
Minimum charge rate EUR
1.00 per gramme Cd; no
threshold or phasing
Charge rates on average
EUR 1.00 per gramme Cd;
no threshold or phasing
Chargeable item Amount of cadmium (by weight) in commercial fertilisers
Chargeable event The first time the charge-
able product is sold in the
EU or the import of the
chargeable product from
outside the EU
The first time the chargeable product is sold in a
Member State applying the charge
Refund on export outside EU outside Member State
Competent
authorities
Fiscal/customs authorities in the Member State where the chargeable event takes place
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5. Impacts of a cadmium charge
$QDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUN
A charge on cadmium in phosphate fertiliser can be expected to have a wide variety of
(potential) impacts, which will work their way all through the complex chain of fertiliser
production, trade and use. It is therefore important to concentrate on those parts of the
chain where the impacts are likely to be significant. Figure 5.1 presents the main elements
and relationships in the chain.
The initial impact of a charge on Cd in phosphate fertiliser is a price difference be-
tween fertilisers with different Cd content  (assuming the producers pass the charge on
to their customers). The fertiliser prices are of course also influenced by numerous other
factors, including the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) . Some of these factors
may also have a differential impact on low-Cd and high-Cd fertilisers8.
Farmers will react to the price differentiation by demanding more fertiliser with a low Cd
content  as well as, to some extent, a reduction of phosphate fertiliser use and/or sub-
stitution by other fertilising products such as sludge or manure . In response to the in-
crease in demand for low-Cd fertiliser, producers will use more raw material (phosphate
rock) with a low Cd content (where this is technically possible), as long as this is a
cheaper option than using decadmiation technology. The higher demand for low-Cd phos-
phate rock will cause an increase in the price of this type of raw material . This means
higher production costs for the fertiliser producer. Under certain assumptions it may be-
come more profitable to use a decadmiation technology  (again: where technically pos-
sible). It is expected that the uptake of decadmiation technologies will increase once these
technologies improve and become less expensive due to e.g. scale and learning effects .
Using charge revenues to finance R&D and pilot projects () can also enhance the profit-
ability and feasibility of decadmiation.
The direct environmental impact is represented by the flow of cadmium to agricultural
land  and the cadmium emissions/discharges from the production of phosphoric acid
and fertiliser .
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phosphoric acid and fertiliser production
(including by-products) 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prices of phosphate rock






In Section 4.3, three different approaches for the cadmium charge have been distin-
guished (‘uniform’, ‘minimum rate’ and ‘divergent’), each of which can be applied in a
‘moderate’ and a ‘stringent’ version. The analysis will be primarily based on the ‘mini-
mum rate, stringent’ option. The other options will be dealt with only if their impact can
be expected to differ significantly from this base case.
Starting from the conceptual model outlined above, three scenarios will be presented,
which describe the possible impacts of the cadmium charge (Section 5.2).  The economic
impacts of the cadmium charge under these scenarios will be analysed for the phosphate
rock and fertiliser producers (Section 5.3) and for agriculture (Section 5.4). Section 5.5
contains an assessment of the consequences for the environment. Section 5.6 deals with
the costs of administration and enforcement and the revenues of the charge.
7KUHHVFHQDULRV
5.2.1 Introduction
Because of the large uncertainties surrounding the relevant factors (such as the impact of
the charge on fertiliser prices, the availability of low-Cd phosphate rock and technologi-
cal developments, in particular the cost and performance of decadmiation technologies),
a scenario type of analysis was chosen to assess the impact of a Cd charge. Three sce-
narios are distinguished, which may also be regarded as possible stages in the future de-
velopment of phosphate fertiliser production (short, medium and long term):
• ‘Business as usual’ (Section 5.2.2);
• ‘Rush for low-cadmium phosphate rock’ (Section 5.2.3);
• ‘Decadmiation breakthrough’ (Section 5.2.4).
The question if and when each of these scenarios/stages will be realised, depends on nu-
merous factors, which will be discussed in each section. One should also be aware that
the chances/timing of realisation may differ between different kinds of phosphate fertil-
iser. Moreover, the developments in the fertiliser market outside the EU are of impor-
tance as well.
5.2.2 ‘Business as usual’
In this scenario/stage, supply and demand of phosphate fertiliser are not (or hardly) af-
fected by the introduction of the cadmium charge. There can be several reasons for this
lack of impact. Fertiliser producers often have long term contracts with their suppliers of
raw materials, which can not be changed at zero cost. Farmers may tend to stick with the
product and the supplier to which they are used, even if they are confronted with a price
increase in the order of magnitude of 10%9 (see also Section 5.4). It is also possible that
the producers of high-Cd fertiliser reduce their sales prices by the amount of the charge
rate, so that the price paid by the user shows no difference by Cd content10. Furthermore,
                                                  
9 Assuming a price of 400 Euro per tonne P2O5, a Cd content of 40 mg per kg P2O5 and a
charge rate of 1 Euro per gramme of cadmium.
10 The scope for European fertiliser producers to do so seems rather limited at present, given
their already low profit margins.
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phosphate rock producers could reduce the prices of high-Cd phosphate rock so as to
maintain their market share. Theoretically, this could go on for a long time if the lowest-
cost producers of high-Cd phosphate rock could reduce their prices so as to compensate
for the Cd tax, and still make a profit. However, it seems unlikely that any major phos-
phate rock producer can afford this strategy. The world’s largest producer, Moroccan
OCP, suffered net losses in 1994 and 1995. In 1996, it made a net profit of MAD 800
million (about EUR 80 million) on an output of 20.8 million tonnes of phosphate rock
(roughly equivalent to 7 million tonnes P2O5) (Demandt, 1999). A profit margin of some
10 EUR per tonne P2O5 would not be sufficient to compensate for a ‘stringent’ Cd charge
of 1 EUR per gramme Cd, given a Cd content in the order of magnitude of 50 mg/kg for
Moroccan phosphate rock.
Thus, while the ‘Business as usual’ scenario may persist for some time (as changes in the
use of raw materials and/or technologies often require substantial amounts of transition
costs, investments and time11), it is unlikely that it can continue indefinitely. The intro-
duction of the cadmium charge creates the opportunity to capture a ‘rent’ from cadmium
reduction somewhere in the phosphate fertiliser chain, and it is reasonable to assume that
eventually this opportunity will be seized. Given the present market situation, the pri-
mary option to do so would be a shift towards the use of raw materials with a low cad-
mium content.
5.2.3 ‘Rush for low-cadmium phosphate rock’
Using phosphate rock with a low cadmium content is likely to be the lowest-cost option
to reduce the cadmium content in phosphate fertilisers12. Initially, it is assumed that no
price difference exists between low and high Cd phosphate rock13. Under certain (rather
simplifying) assumptions, it can be showed that decadmiation is the most profitable op-




 (in grammes cad-
mium per tonne of P2O5), in which C is the cost of decadmiation (in EUR per tonne of
P2O5 LVWKHSURSRUWLRQRIFDGPLXPUHPDLQLQJLQWKHSKRVSKRULFDFLGDIWHUGHFDGPLa-
tion, and T is the charge rate (in EUR per gramme of Cd)14. Stated differently, there are
                                                  
11 It takes longer to establish a new phosphate rock mine than it does to build an new fertiliser
plant (IFA/UNEP, 1998).
12 From our interviews it became clear that in the Netherlands TSP producers are already in-
creasingly using low cadmium phosphate rock, because the amount of heavy metals in waste
water is lower and less treatment is necessary (in order to comply with waste water stan-
dards).
13 To what extent this assumption is justified is unclear. An analysis of the prices paid for phos-
phate rock imported in the Netherlands (based on CBS, 1995) suggests that some “low-
cadmium premium” might already exist as a result of the regulations and voluntary commit-
ments regarding cadmium emissions by the Dutch phosphate fertiliser industry: phosphate
rock from Jordan and South Africa costs about EUR 3.50 more than the average price. How-
ever, the price of phosphate rock from Russia (also low-Cd) is about EUR 2.50 lower than
the average. Differences in quality of the raw material are probably a much more important
factor than differences in Cd content (see also Subsection 5.3.3).
14 This is a specific case of a more general model, which is presented in Appendix I.
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no economic reasons to apply decadmiation as long as phosphate rock is available with a
cadmium content below the mentioned concentration. If  we assume that T equals EUR 1
SHUJUDPPHFDGPLXPDVLQWKHµVWULQJHQW¶YHUVLRQRIWKHFKDUJHDQGWKDW LVQHJOLJLEOH
then the costs of decadmiation (in EUR per tonne P2O5) equal the concentration of cad-
mium (in grammes per tonne P2O5) below which decadmiation is unprofitable. Assum-
ing, for example, that decadmiation costs are 10 EUR per tonne of P2O5, using phosphate
rock with a cadmium content below 10 grammes per tonne is cheaper than applying
decadmiation. If the charge rate were EUR 0.25 per gramme, as in the ‘moderate’ ver-
sion, the ‘break even point’ would be 40 grammes of cadmium per tonne P2O5.
Table 5.1 shows the estimated global reserves15 of phosphate rock and the range of their
cadmium contents. For some countries, a feasible option might be to apply ‘selective
mining’ and use the phosphate rock with the lowest Cd content for export to the EU.
However, it is likely that low-Cd rock will be mainly provided by countries with large
reserves of magmatic P rock, i.e. South Africa and Russia. Given the fact that the current
annual consumption of phosphate fertiliser in the EU is less than 4 million tonnes P2O5
per year, it can be concluded from Table 5.1 that the stocks of low-Cd phosphate rock in
South Africa and Russia are sufficient to provide the EU with P fertiliser for about 300
years16. Many of these reserves have a cadmium content of less than 1 gramme per tonne
P2O5. Thus, under the assumptions mentioned before, the costs of decadmiation would
have to decrease to 1 EUR per tonne P2O5 or less to make decadmiation profitable at a
charge rate of 1 EUR per gramme cadmium. Alternatively, with constant decadmiation
costs of 10 EUR per tonne P2O5, the charge rate would have to increase to 10 EUR per
gramme cadmium or even higher.
The question then is, of course, whether the producers of low-Cd phosphate rock are able
to supply the raw material at a price which would keep the profitability of decadmiation
below that of using low-Cd rock. In any case, the introduction of a cadmium charge al-
lows them to increase their prices to some extent. The maximum price increase is ap-
proximately the same as the cost of decadmiation17. Thus, low-Cd phosphate rock can
become almost 10 EUR per tonne P2O5 more expensive than high-Cd rock and still re-
main competitive.
                                                  
15 A “reserve” (or “economic reserve”) is ususally defined as a mineral deposit of established
extension that is – or could be – profitably mined under prevailing costs, market prices and
technology. A “resource” (or “reserve base”) is considered to be a deposit of less well de-
fined size which is not now economically exploitable but which could potentially become so,
if there was a sufficiently favourable change in costs, prices or technology (IFA/UNEP,
1998). In 1998, world phosphate rock reserves were estimated by the US Geological Survey
to amount to about 11 billion tonnes, with a reserve base of about 33 billion tonnes. Botschek
and Van Balken (1999) reported somewhat higher figures: 14.1 and 36.6 billion tonnes, re-
spectively.
16 For the whole world, the present level of P2O5 consumption (about 40 million tonnes) could
be covered for some 30 years by these low-cadmium reserves.




Origin Cd content range





South Africa 0.1 –   10  1 800
Russia 0.3 –     5  2.8 400
USA 7    – 375 14  400
Jordan 12    –   28  1.5  200
Morocco 13    – 165  6.5 2000
Israel 16    – 126  1.2   60
Tunisia 94  2.1   90
Senegal 161    – 336  0.7   50
Togo 164    – 179  0.7   10
Other (*) 0.2 – 63  2.5  240
(*) Algeria, Syria, Finland and Sweden.
Note: A global mean P2O5 content of 33% in phosphate rock is assumed. Economic reserves
are recoverable at a cost below USD 35 per tonne P rock. China, Kazakhstan and Brazil
omitted because of unknown cadmium content.
Source:Calculated on the basis of Botschek and Van Balken (1999).
It is unknown what the exact impact of production expansion will be on the costs (and
thus on the price) of low-Cd phosphate rock. Sedimentary rock is said to be less expen-
sive, since it can be mined in an open pit and therefore is much cheaper than the mining
of  (low-Cd) magmatic rock. However, it is estimated that the South African and Russian
reserves (amounting to 3800 million tonnes of phosphate rock) can be produced at a cost
below USD (or EUR) 35 per tonne (Botschek and Van Balken, 1999). Current market
prices of South African phosphate rock in the Netherlands are about 35 EUR per tonne
(cif) (calculated on the basis of CBS, 1995). Allowing for transport costs (which can
amount to 10 or 20% of total end-user costs - Coster, 1999; Demandt, 1999; IFA/UNEP,
1998), one can conclude that the South African reserves can be mined at a cost which is
less than 7 EUR per tonne higher than at present.
7KHDERYHDQDO\VLVZDVEDVHGRQWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHFRHIILFLHQW ZDV]HURLHWKH
decadmiation process is 100% effective and no cadmium is left in the purified phospho-
ric acid. In reality, decadmiation will have a maximum effectiveness of about 90% (see
7DEOHVR LVDURXQG7KLVLPSOLHVWKDWUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHFKDUJHOHYHOGHFDGPi-
ation could only become attractive if there were ‘high-Cd’ phosphate rock with a cad-
mium content which is less than ten times as high as the Cd content of the available low-
Cd rock. However, the reserves of ‘high-Cd’ rock usually have Cd contents exceeding 10
mg per kg P2O5, while those of the ‘low-Cd’ rock reserves are often below 1 mg/kg. This
is an additional reason why the Cd charge will favour the use of igneous, low-Cd phos-
phate rock.
The expansion of phosphate mining (and possibly also investments in processing capac-
ity, such as phosphoric acid and fertiliser production) in South Africa and Russia will of
course only take place if potential investors have sufficient confidence in its profitability.
One precondition to achieve this is a consistent and determined cadmium policy in the
EU. The ‘stringent’ version of the Cd charge will be most supportive, because it creates
the largest incentive as well as the largest market for low-Cd fertiliser. Another precon-
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dition is probably some degree of economic and political stability in the country where
the investment is planned. At present, the situation in South Africa seems to be some-
what better than in Russia in this respect. On the other hand, Russia is likely to have a
substantial amount of excess production capacity18, which might be refurbished and
modernised at relatively low cost.
Obviously, the preceding presupposes that magmatic (igneous) phosphate rock is an
equivalent substitute for sedimentary rock. To what extent this assumption is justified, is
unclear. According to Botschek and Van Balken (1999), igneous rock may be more dif-
ficult to process. Furthermore, phosphoric acid production plants are usually ‘tailored’
for a specific source and grade of rock. Changing this source and grade is costly in terms
of the time taken to re-adjust the process. A different source of rock may often necessi-
tate additional equipment (IFA/UNEP, 1998). Nevertheless, the example given in Table
5.2 suggests that industry can deal with substantial changes in the origin of phosphate
rock within a few years’ time.
7DEOH 3KRVSKDWHURFNLPSRUWVLQWKH1HWKHUODQGVE\FRXQWU\RIRULJLQLQRIWR
WDOSKRVSKDWHURFNLPSRUWV
country of origin 1992 1995
Russia 8 23
Morocco 18 13





Source: CBS (1992, 1995).
In some cases, igneous rock can not be used at all as a raw material for technical reasons
(in particular for the production of triple superphosphate, TSP – Coster, 1999). However,
TSP accounts for only 10% of phosphate fertiliser use in the EU (EFMA, 1997a), and
only one third of the phosphate in TSP comes directly from phosphate rock (the other
two third comes from phosphoric acid). Moreover, there are also sedimentary deposits
with low cadmium contents which could be used in these cases19.
5.2.4 ‘Decadmiation breakthrough’
In the preceding section, it was argued that even in the case of a ‘minimum rate and
stringent’ charge on cadmium the large scale application of decadmiation technologies in
phosphate fertiliser production is not to be expected in the near future. This conclusion
was  based on the assumption that large amounts of low-Cd phosphate rock are available
at competitive prices. If this assumption is violated (e.g. because of technical barriers for
using low-Cd rock, or lack of short term expansion opportunities for low-Cd rock pro-
                                                  
18 In 1988, phosphate rock production in the then USSR peaked at 39 million tonnes. In 1996,
the total production of the former USSR states was only 10.2 million tonnes (8.7 in Russia
and 1.5 in Kazakhstan) (FAO, 1997).
19 In addition to the countries mentioned in the upper part of Table 3.2, China is also reported to
have reserves of low-Cd sedimentary phosphate rock (Demandt, 1999).
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ducing countries, leading to price increases for this type of rock), conditions may be-
come more favourable for a ‘decadmiation’ scenario20. Decadmiation might also become
more attractive if the cost of these technologies can be drastically reduced21, and/or if the
cadmium charge rate is increased well above 1 EUR per gramme, but only if the decad-
miation technology leads to very low residual levels of cadmium in the fertiliser (sub-
stantially lower than the cadmium concentrations in low-Cd phosphate rock).
Various decadmiation technologies have been or are currently being developed and
tested. Basically, there are two ways to remove cadmium: either from the phosphate rock
(by means of calcination) or from the phosphoric acid. The latter option is considered to
be the most feasible one, with the ‘CC’ process (co-crystallisation of cadmium with an-
hydrite) being the most promising route. A more detailed description of the various tech-
nologies and their estimated costs was presented in Chapter 3.
5.2.5 Conclusions
At current prices and costs, using low-Cd phosphate rock is likely to be the preferred
strategy to be followed by fertiliser producers in response to the introduction of a cad-
mium charge in the medium and probably even in the long run. The reserves of low-Cd
phosphate rock are large, and it seems unlikely that they will be rapidly depleted, as con-
cern over cadmium in fertiliser is confined to the EU and some other rich countries. It is
therefore unlikely that scarcity of low-Cd rock will soon lead to considerable price in-
creases. The ‘low-Cd rock’ option is thus expected to be a relatively low-cost response to
the introduction of a Cd levy. The fact that with a charge producers can decide them-
selves whether and when to switch to low-cadmium raw materials adds to the cost-
efficiency of this scenario.
,PSDFWVRQSURGXFHUV RISKRVSKDWHURFNDQGIHUWLOLVHUV
5.3.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 it was already stated that Finland is the only producer of phosphate rock in
the EU: most of it is imported, mainly from Morocco (37.1%). Processed phosphate is to
a large extent also imported, mainly from Morocco (33.8%), the former Soviet Union
(22.7%) and Algeria (14.1%); some is traded within the EU (14.3%). More phosphate
rock is imported in the EU than processed phosphate (cf. Figure 2.1). The profit margins
are low since the FSU is exporting large quantities in order to receive hard currencies. In
the long run it is expected that this situation will change once the economic situation in
                                                  
20 Our contacts in the fertiliser industry (Langeveld, 1999; Bertilsson, 1999; Van Balken, 1999)
suggested that such barriers do indeed exist and that decadmiation will become necessary
once the demand for low-Cd fertiliser increases. However, they could not give estimates for
the maximum amount of low-Cd reserves which can be readily used as substitutes for cur-
rently used high-Cd rock.
21 This cost reduction may be achieved by the scale and learning effects which usually occur
when a new technology becomes more common. Another source of cost reduction could be
subsidies: from the governments of phosphate rock producing countries (interested in main-
taining their export revenues) and/or from the EU.
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the Russian Federation has improved and specifically the economic situation in agricul-
ture area has enhanced.
In this analysis a distinction is made regarding producers within the EU and producers
outside the EU. This section provides an overview of the factors determining the com-
petitiveness of the phosphate fertiliser industry.
5.3.2 The cost of phosphate fertiliser production
Besides the capital cost of investment in the plant itself, the cost of raw materials, energy
and transport and distribution has to be taken into account. For phosphate fertiliser, the
cost of energy is relatively low compared to ammonia or nitrogen fertilisers. Depending
on the quality of the rock, 1.3 to 1.6 tonnes of phosphate rock is needed to produce a
tonne of TSP (containing 45% P2O5). In addition, 0.35 tonne of phosphoric acid is
needed that requires about the same amount of sulphur. In other words: the price of TSP
largely depends on the price of phosphate rock and sulphur. Transportation and distribu-
tion can count for 10 up to even 20% of consumer price (cf. Subsection 5.2.3).
5.3.3 The sales price of phosphate fertiliser
Over the last years the prices of phosphate fertilisers were stable, because of supply con-
trol programs of major exporters. In the third quarter of this year the prices have de-
creased: prices for diammonium phosphate (DAP) fell by 8% and for triple superphos-
phate (TSP) by 7%. The drop in prices is explained by overcapacity and weak demand
due to low grain prices (Global Commodity Markets, EFMA press release October ’99).
For the current market prices cadmium content is not an issue, prices are set basically on
the basis of a negotiating process involving the duration of the contract (even up to 5
years) and the quality of the rock.
As can be seen from Table 5.3, the cost price of phosphate fertiliser has increased some-
what due to higher price of phosphate rock, while at the same time the market price has
decreased, putting more pressure on the profitability margins (assuming the price of sul-
phur remained stable).
Looking at different Quarterly Reports from the fertiliser industry, it turns out that many




















1997 1998 1999 1998 1998 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999 1999
P.R. 41.0 43.0 44.0 43.0 43.0 44.0 44.0 44.0 44.0 44.0 44.0
DAP 199.9 203.4 184.2 209.5 204.4 199.3 189.7 173.9 175.0 164.5 152.9
TSP 171.9 173.1 157.8 175.0 168.9 164.1 162.6 150.9 151.3 147.5 145.1
Note:P.R. stands for phosphate rock
Source: World Bank (1999)
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5.3.4 Short term impact of the  levy on fertiliser sales
European consumption of phosphate fertiliser has decreased by 1.4% by during
1998/1999, after a decline of some 45% since the peaks of fertiliser consumption in the
1970s and 1980s. The main reductions achieved during the past decade were due to:
• the price reductions in the common market regimes of the CAP, reducing interven-
tion prices of cereals, oilseeds and protein crops, which were accompanied by agri-
environmental policies in the context of Regulation 2078/92;
• environmental legislation in several Member States, resulting into an improved use
of organic nutrients. Such legislation also reduced the overuse in some countries, and
contributed to a more rationalised used of nutrients in agriculture.
The national statistics developed by EFMA (1999) indicate that demand by 2009 will be
decreased by another 10% within EU15. The reduction is projected to slow down rela-
tive to the past trends. The estimate is based on their market perspectives considering a
10% set-aside requirement until 2006 and a 15% reduction cut of intervention prices of
cereals.
Assuming a general cadmium content of 25 mg/kg phosphate rock and a charge of 1
Euro/g Cd in phosphate fertiliser, the price of phosphate fertiliser will increase by 75 Eu-
ros per tonne P2O5, (assuming a 33% P2O5 content in phosphate rock), being about 34
Euros per tonne TSP and resulting in about a 23% price increase for that type of fertil-
iser. Given the economic situation of the industry (low profit margins) it is highly prob-
able that the levy will be entirely passed on to the final consumers. In a Swedish study
(Drake and Hellstrand, 1998) the demand elasticity for phosphate fertiliser is estimated
to be −0.1 to −0.25, so decline in consumption of, in this case, TSP would be between 2
to maximum 6% due to the levy. For other phosphate fertilisers, with lower P2O5 con-
tent, the impact would be smaller. In reality, the price increase (and thus the decrease in
fertiliser sales) will be even less, because it will be more attractive for the producers to
use low-Cd rock (in the ‘low-Cd’ scenario) or to remove cadmium from the phosphoric
acid (in the ‘decadmiation’ scenario) than to pay the full charge on an unchanged cad-
mium content.
In the ‘divergent’ version of the charge, farmers in border regions may decide to buy
their fertiliser in a neighbour country which does not apply a cadmium charge. The same
may happen in the ‘minimum rate’ version, where Member States are allowed to apply a
higher charge rate than the EU minimum. However, the extent of this border traffic will
remain limited due to transport costs.
It can be concluded that the impact of the levy on fertiliser sales will be small. The levy
might to an almost negligible extent accelerate the downward trend in consumption and
might initiate some substitution from fertiliser to manure (or sludge) (see also Section
5.4).
5.3.5 Impact of the levy on EU producers
To a large extent, the fate of the EU phosphate fertiliser industry in the years ahead will
be determined by the decrease in demand on the home market, and the increasing com-
petition from non-EU producers. Companies will close because their production lines for
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phosphate fertiliser are no longer economically viable. The levy can accelerate this trend
somewhat, and can at the most be one additional factor for closing down. However, the
levy will not contribute significantly to the relocation of fertiliser industries outside the
EU. The levy does not favour production in non-EU countries, as it applies equally to
domestic and foreign phosphate fertilisers. The main determinant and justification for
industry relocation are usually the better market perspectives outside the EU.
µ5XVKIRUORZ&GURFN¶VFHQDULR
A levy on cadmium in fertiliser will be faced by all producers within the EU using phos-
phate rock for fertiliser production. Raw material costs for industry will slightly increase,
but this will not affect their competitive position substantially, as their competitors face
the same cost increase. There will be some once-only costs (for investment, adaptation
and transition) as well, because production processes may have to be redesigned so as to
be able to process igneous phosphate rock (which is structurally different from sedi-
mentary rock). Producers already using low cadmium phosphate rock will have a com-
parative advantage over those who don’t, since they will not need to make any  techno-
logical adjustments for using different rocks22.
Most companies will shift to low cadmium rock once their contracts are finished to the
technical extent possible. The adjustments made and the finetuning of the technology to
a new kind of rock can take several months to sometimes 2 years before the plant is run-
ning efficiently again. The economics of such decisions will vary depending on the tech-
nological status of a company and the economic lifetime of its technology.
These temporary problems can be overcome if the levy is announced long before it is
actually put into place, to allow some transition time for companies. Moreover, the ad-
vantage of using a charge as the policy instrument is that companies can determine on an
individual basis the optimum timing of the necessary investments, rather than having to
comply simultaneously and instantaneously with some mandatory maximum cadmium
concentration. This helps to avoid capital destruction.
µ'HFDGPLDWLRQEUHDNWKURXJK¶VFHQDULR
Decadmiation raises the production cost of phosphate fertiliser. Given the early stages of
development in which most technologies find themselves, it is not surprising that cost
estimates are rough and contain wide margins of uncertainty. The available estimates for
various decadmiation technologies were presented in Table 3.3. Generally, it can be as-
sumed that the production costs of phosphate fertiliser will increase by some 10%23. As
all phosphate fertiliser suppliers are confronted with this cost increase, they will be able
to pass the additional costs on to their customers and the economic impact will be lim-
                                                  
22 Obviously, this advantage will be smaller if there is time for adaptation between the an-
nouncement and the actual introduction of the tax.
23 Lin and Schorr (1997) mention a figure of 20%. On the other hand, the figures mentioned in
ERM (1997) (about USD 30 per tonne P2O5, but possibly down to USD 9) are much lower
(assuming a production cost of some 500 USD per tonne P2O5). Langeveld (1999) estimates
the price increase at 8 to 10%.
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ited. However, it is conceivable that for some ‘marginal’ fertiliser producers the addi-
tional costs will be the last straw breaking the camel’s back24.
5.3.6 Producers outside EU
µ5XVKIRUORZ&GURFN¶VFHQDULR
The producers of low cadmium phosphate rock (South Africa, Russian Federation) will
benefit from the levy on cadmium. Currently South African production is about 3 million
ton/year, estimated resources 2.5 billion tonnes. Within the FSU production is 8.5 mil-
lion tonnes and an estimated reserve of 1.3 billion (1994 numbers). In combination with
the envisaged decline in phosphate fertiliser use, rock scarcity is unlikely to increase the
price level in the long term, but limited production capacity might do so in the short
term. It is not expected that the FSU will export less in the near future, meaning that the
export to the European Union will not be harmed, especially if the downward trend in
consumption will continue.
Thus, the ‘low-Cd phosphate rock’ scenario/stage will lead to market segmentation and
have dramatic consequences for the supply pattern of phosphate to the EU. South Africa
and probably also Russia will replace Morocco as the EU’s main phosphate supplier.
Countries producing P rock with the highest levels of cadmium concentration (such as
Senegal, Togo and Tunisia) will have to look for other markets, as demand from the EU
fades. Whether they will find such markets depends on the extent to which cadmium
policies are pursued in the rest of the world as well. The best opportunities will probably
be found in the developing countries, where cadmium in fertilisers is not much of an is-
sue and where the demand for fertilisers is expected to increase at an annual rate of 3.8%
in the period until 2010 (FAO, quoted in EC, 1997)25.
Obviously, the largest impact on phosphate trade will occur in the case of the ‘uniform’
and the ‘minimum rate’ approach, combined with the ‘stringent’ version of the charge,
where a cadmium charge rate of (at least) 1 Euro per gramme applies in all EU countries.
The ‘divergent’ approach implies a lack of action in about half of the EU, which means
that these countries have no need to look for other phosphate suppliers. Moreover, in the
‘moderate’ version a threshold is applied, below which no levy is due. This creates an
opportunity for countries producing sedimentary phosphate rock with a Cd content be-
low that threshold (eventually 20 mg/kg P2O5) to supply uncharged phosphate rock to the
EU by selective mining. These countries include Jordan, Syria, Israel, Morocco, the USA
and possibly China.
µ'HFDGPLDWLRQEUHDNWKURXJK¶VFHQDULR
To maintain their market share, producers of phosphates can decide to decadmiate on
site: this means that the cadmium problem is tranferred to outside the boundaries of the
European Union. The Commission could provide assistance for an action plan to make
                                                  
24 Large fertiliser producers may decide to keep their prices initially at the existing lower level,
in order to get rid of smaller competitors who do not have the financial strength to do so.
25 This shift in export markets is already visible in the case of Morocco, whose largest single
customer for phosphoric acid is India (Demandt, 1999).
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sure that this is done in a environmentally responsible manner. The option that Moroccan
(or other) producers will decrease prices to compensate for the tax is not likely given the
current market circumstances (see Section 5.2.2).
As in the case of the ‘low Cd rock’ scenario, the main economic impact of a decadmia-
tion breakthrough is likely to be a shift in the trade flows of raw material. The impact on
trade flows of phosphate rock depends on the type of decadmiation technology which
will turn out to be the most cost-effective. If calcination (cadmium removal from phos-
phate rock) would be the preferred decadmiation technology, demand for phosphate rock
would shift to those countries which can supply types of rock which are suitable for this
treatment. However, calcination has a number of limitations and disadvantages: it is not
suitable for all kinds of phosphate rock (only for those with a high organic matter con-
tent), it requires high temperatures, it changes the structure of the phosphate, and there is
a risk of cadmium emissions to air (Ghoshesh HWDO, 1996; ERM, 1998; Lin and Schorr,
1997; Coster, 1999). In the more likely case that a process for the decadmiation of phos-
phoric acid will be the winning technology, the impact on phosphate rock trade will de-
pend on the version of the levy.
According to Van Balken (1999), the amount of cadmium removed by the process is a
certain percentage of the initial concentration. This means that in the ‘stringent’ version
of the levy there will still be a tendency for the demand to shift towards low-Cd rock.
For example, if the effectiveness of the process is 90%, phosphate rock with an initial Cd
concentration of 50 mg per kg P2O5 will lead to a post-treatment concentration of 5,
whereas the residual concentration is twice as high if the phosphate rock contained 100
mg/kg. Thus, even with decadmiation, using low-Cd rock remains the most attractive
option. In the ‘moderate’ version, however, where there is a threshold for the concentra-
tion below which no charge is due, there will be less of an impact on phosphate rock
trade flows, because a 90% removal efficiency would ensure a final Cd concentration of
less than 20 mg per kg P2O5 for almost any kind of phosphate rock used.
Countries that are currently expanding their export-oriented phosphoric acid production
capacity (such as Tunisia and Jordan) could profit from an early ‘decadmiation break-
through’ scenario, because they may incorporate the decadmiation process in the design
of their new production facilities.
5.3.7 Conclusions
The main economic impact of a cadmium levy will be a major shift of phosphate (rock,
but probably also acid and fertiliser) trade flows. In the ‘stringent’ version of the levy,
South Africa and possibly Russia will probably become the main suppliers of the EU at
the expense of Morocco and other African countries.
The advantage of using a charge as the policy instrument is that companies can deter-
mine on an individual basis the optimum timing of the necessary investments, rather than
having to comply simultaneously and instantaneously with some mandatory maximum
cadmium concentration. This helps to avoid capital destruction.
If the introduction of a cadmium charge would lead to a transition towards decadmiation
of phosphoric acid, this could mitigate the adverse impact on the exports of countries
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producing phosphate rock with a high cadmium content. However, such a transition is
only likely to take place if several conditions are fulfilled:
• the costs of decadmiation should substantially decrease and/or the charge rate should
be substantially higher than the assumed 1 Euro per gramme Cd;
• there should be a threshold concentration below which the charge does not apply (as
in the ‘moderate’ version);
• the cadmium concentration in the phosphate after decadmiation should be substan-
tially lower than the concentrations found in igneous (low-Cd) phosphate rock.
It seems questionable whether these conditions will easily be met in the foreseeable fu-
ture, even if the development of decadmiation technology is speeded up by massive fi-
nancial support from the EU and others.
,PSDFWVRQDJULFXOWXUH
An assessment on the economic and environmental impacts of a charge on cadmium in
fertilisers requires information on the response by farmers to an increase in the price of
phosphate fertilisers. A tax on cadmium in fertilisers may lead to a change in the compo-
sition of phosphate fertilisers. Also, it may lead to a reduction in fertiliser input. Several
studies however indicate the inelastic nature on the demand for chemical fertilisers fol-
lowing price changes. Short-run own-price elasticity on the demand for chemical fertilis-
ers ranges from –0.2 to –0.3 (Bäckmann, 1999). However, a stronger response of a price
change is expected in the long-run and the own-price elasticity may reach –0.5 to –0.6
due to improvements in farmers’ efficiency of using agrochemicals. Also, a tax on
chemical fertilisers would increase the opportunity costs of organic fertilisers and may
result in a more efficient use of livestock manure for crop production.
Limited information is available on the price elasticity of phosphorus fertilisers. The
price elasticity for phosphorus fertilisers is assessed to be low in Sweden. For conditions
in Sweden it is considered to be in the range between –0.1 and –0.25 (Drake and Hell-
strand, 1998). No information is available on the long-run price elasticity, but it might
possibly be some 50% higher than the estimated short-run price elasticity.
The relative importance of the charge is examined for various types of farming in Swe-
den and the Netherlands.
Sweden
Drake and Hellstrand (1998) quantify the costs of a tax on cadmium in phosphorus fer-
tilisers for Swedish farmers at regional level. Currently, a tax is applied of 30 SEK per
gram cadmium for levels above 5 gram cadmium per tonne phosphorus. The average
level of cadmium in phosphorus fertiliser currently is 25 gram per tonne phosphorus, and
the price of phosphorus fertilisers is increased by 0.60 SEK per kg. This is based on the
consideration that the tax is completely covered in fertiliser prices.
The calculated costs for tax on cadmium on average are less than 5 SEK per hectare,
which is to have an insignificant impact on the application of phosphate fertiliser use
(Table 5.4). The total costs of the tax are small and amount to less than 0.05% of total




Production region Costs (SEK per ha) Total (million SEK)
Plain districts, South Götaland 5.52 1.73
South east Götaland 3.66 1.09
Plain districts, North Götaland 6.84 2.60
Plain districts, Svealand 5.46 2.74
Forest districts, Götaland 3.30 1.56
Forest districts, central Sweden 4.38 0.74
Lower parts of Norrland 2.88 0.43
Upper parts of Norrland 4.50 0.48
Total 4.74 11.30
Source: Drake and Hellstrand (1998).
The Netherlands
Total use of phosphate fertilisers in the Netherlands is 71 kton P2O5. It includes NPK-,
NP- and PK-nutrients (41 kton), triple-superphosphate (13 kton) and di-ammonium-
phosphate (17 kton).
The assessment in this section is based on an agricultural sector model for the Nether-
lands (DRAM). The model can be characterised as a price-endogenous, spatial equilib-
rium market model. The model has endogenous economic and environmental variables.
Agricultural policies, technical development and environmental policies are exogenous
variables. The model is built around a set of linear regional demand and supply functions
describing the most important regional input and output markets of the Dutch agricul-
tural sector. The model distinguishes fourteen regions. Seven regions have clayey soil,
five regions have sandy soil and two regions have peat soil. Each region is treated like a
large, more or less mixed farm.
First, some figures are presented for some major crops on fertiliser consumption in the
Netherlands (kg P2O5 per hectare). The figures are based on recommended dosages for
the Netherlands:
• Edible potatoes 79.7
• Starch potatoes 71.2
• Grass 18.8
• Sugarbeet 47.1
• Wheat   8.4
Table 5.5 shows the regional distribution of these five crops in the Netherlands. More
than half of the agricultural land is used to grow grass. Dairy production (using grass for
fodder) is the dominant land use category in the peat areas of the country. Cereals, pota-
toes and sugarbeet are the three major arable crops grown. The production of edible po-
tatoes is mainly concentrated in the clay areas of the country (the polder provinces along
the Ijsselmeer and the south-west of the country, Zuidelijk Zeekleigebied). The produc-
tion of starch potatoes is concentrated in the Veenkoloniën. In these regions, the use of








Centraal Zandgebied 459 615 59227 956 2582
Hollandse Droogmakerijen
and Ysselmeerpolders 18635 48 20598 20806 26517
Noordelijk Weidegebied 781 1132 160644 814 2185
Noordelijk Zand 2778 23811 149122 10228 12805
Noordelijk Zeekleigebied 3162 4200 62959 12687 37884
Overig Noord-Holland 397 3 15966 118 631
Oostelijk Zandgebied 1772 3776 135829 2242 5469
Overig Zuid-Holland 135 0 3261 85 246
Rivierkleigebied 2530 216 85974 3257 6606
Veenkoloniën 603 27763 12949 12774 14698
Westelijk Weidegebied 2326 94 162336 2879 5626
Zuid-Limburg 1954 67 13253 4473 6373
Zuidelijk Zandgebied 14295 1047 119437 16991 19096
Zuidelijk Zeekleigebied 33484 49 33244 27891 58859
Total 83310 62820 1034801 116201 199579
The analysis is based on the consideration of a fixed charge per gram cadmium. The total load of
cadmium is estimated for the Netherlands at a level of 1800 kg. A charge of 1 Euro per gram
cadmium implies total revenues of Euro 1,800,000. The analysis is based on the consideration of
an equal content of cadmium per kg of phosphate.
Table 5.6 shows the charge (Euro per hectare), based on calculations made with the
DRAM model. The charge ranges between around 2.2 Euro per hectare (growing edible
potatoes) and around 0.2 Euro per hectare (wheat). Charges are a very small part of total
costs. No shifts in agricultural production are observed with such small levels of the
charge. A doubling of the charge rate (as in the ‘stringent’ version) would still have very
limited consequences on the costs per hectare.
Table 5.7 shows the total amount paid by farming type. It is based on the charges per
hectare and the acreage covered for each farming type. The total charge of 1,800,000
Euro is covered mainly by grazing livestock farms (more than 800,000 Euro) and arable
farms (almost 600,000 Euro). The amounts charged to arable farms (around 40-60 Euro
per holding) on average are substantially above those of grazing livestock farms (less








Centraal Zandgebied 2.12 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.30
Hollandse Droogmakerijen and
Ysselmeerpolders 2.28 1.98 0.54 1.36 0.08
Noordelijk Weidegebied 2.12 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.08
Noordelijk Zand 2.00 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.42
Noordelijk Zeekleigebied 2.28 1.98 0.54 1.36 0.14
Overig Noord-Holland 2.28 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.16
Oostelijk Zandgebied 2.06 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.72
Overig Zuid-Holland 2.30 0.00 0.52 1.26 0.22
Rivierkleigebied 2.26 1.98 0.52 1.36 0.18
Veenkoloniën 2.06 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.30
Westelijk Weidegebied 2.26 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.06
Zuid-Limburg 2.28 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.18
Zuidelijk Zandgebied 2.02 1.98 0.52 1.26 0.82
Zuidelijk Zeekleigebied 2.28 1.98 0.54 1.36 0.10









Centraal Zandgebied 4680 316 42318 61008
Hollandse Droogmakerijen and
Ysselmeerpolders 118768 13320 15946 169758
Noordelijk Weidegebied 6164 784 101378 112902
Noordelijk Zand 62888 1764 120050 209924
Noordelijk Zeekleigebied 66520 1290 35434 114428
Overig Noord-Holland 1524 16148 8656 29322
Oostelijk Zandgebied 20688 924 131658 194670
Overig Zuid-Holland 730 5968 1544 8852
Rivierkleigebied 11702 1366 65146 94550
Veenkoloniën 69924 452 12322 94632
Westelijk Weidegebied 12114 11190 93532 128114
Zuid-Limburg 9336 136 13086 29682
Zuidelijk Zandgebied 47586 15638 153140 327588
Zuidelijk Zeekleigebied 162746 5564 23726 224566
Total 595366 74862 817936 1800000
Conclusions
Generally speaking, the introduction of a charge on cadmium in fertilisers is unlikely to have
major economic impacts on agriculture. The share of fertilisers and soil improvers in the to-
tal costs of various farm types in the EU is usually (well) below 20%. As phosphate accounts
only for part of these costs, the cadmium charge (which will presumably increase the price of
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phosphate fertiliser by some 10%) will in most cases lead to a cost increase for farmers of
less than 1%.
Other mechanisms might also take place. Phosphate fertilisers might be replaced by other
sources of phosphate (such as manure, sewage sludge and compost). There is no empirical
evidence on the extent to which this substitution might take place.
,PSDFWVRQWKHHQYLURQPHQW
The environmental impact of the ‘Business as usual’ scenario is clearly negligible. This
section will therefore only discuss the impact of the two other scenarios. The analysis
takes the present levels of phosphate fertiliser use as the baseline. Changes in cadmium
load to the environment due to changes in phosphate fertiliser use are therefore not taken
into account. Given the expected reduction in phosphate fertiliser use in most EU coun-
tries, this implies an underestimation of actual cadmium flow reductions.
Figure 5.2 shows the initial flows of cadmium contained in the phosphate rock which is
used to make the P fertilisers which are applied in EU agriculture. The total amount of
cadmium in phosphate rock is estimated at 175 tonnes (3,500 Kt P2O5 with an average
Cd content of 50 mg per kg), and the figure shows the division among the different fer-
tilisers (the boxes at the right hand side of the figure) and the phosphogypsum. On the
basis of available data and some assumptions regarding the share of products and pro-
duction processes26 and the division of cadmium between phosphoric acid and phospho-
gypsum27, it can be shown that about 80% of the cadmium ends up in the fertiliser and
20% in the gypsum. In the following subsections, the changes in amounts and percent-
ages under the two scenarios will be assessed.
                                                  
26 The shares of the various P fertilisers are taken from EFMA (1997, Table II). It is assumed
that 50% of the NP(K) fertilisers used in the EU is made by means of the nitrophosphate pro-
cess. The category “other straight P fertilisers” is assumed to contain all the cadmium that
was present in the phosphate rock used to make it.
27 It is assumed that the “wet process” acidulation leads to a division of 30% of the cadmium in
the waste gypsum and 70% in the phosphoric acid. According to Lin and Schorr (1997), these
proportions vary between 20/80 in the case of Morocco and Togo rock, and 33/67 in the case
of  various Florida rocks. UNEP (1998) states that 20 to 40% of the cadmium in the phos-
phate rock passes into the phosphogypsum, depending on the process. CBS (1993) states that
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5.5.1 ‘Rush for low-cadmium phosphate rock’
Substituting low-Cd for high-Cd phosphate rock to produce phosphate fertiliser implies
that a certain amount of cadmium remains in the earth’s crust instead of being brought
into circulation. The percentage reduction in cadmium load to the environment will be
the same as the percentage reduction in average cadmium content of the phosphate rock
mined. The relative division of cadmium flows among the various routes depicted in
Figure 5.1 does not change (provided that the use of the different fertiliser types remains
the same). Assuming a reduction of average Cd content in phosphate rock from 50 to 5
mg per kg P2O5, the cadmium flows will become like in Figure 5.3. Both the cadmium
load to agricultural land and in the phosphogypsum will be reduced by 90%. Part of the
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Part of the latter reduction would take place in phosphoric acid producing countries out-
side the EU. Obviously, the reductions will be smaller in the ‘moderate’ version and the
‘divergent’ approach of the charge. Furthermore, there will be geographical differences
in the environmental impact of the reductions in cadmium load, depending on soil con-
ditions, fertilisation practices and crops grown .
The relocation of phosphate mining and phosphoric acid / fertiliser production activities
will have impacts on the (local) environment in the producing regions. The seriousness
of these impacts will depend largely on the extent to which Best Available Technology
(BAT) is used in the production processes. Furthermore, it means that closure of existing
mines and plants will be speeded up, with implications for site remediation and clean-up.
A possible indirect environmental impact of the ‘low-Cd rock’ scenario is an increase in
the use of high-Cd phosphate fertiliser (and thus higher cadmium discharges) in other
parts of the world, especially in (developing) countries which have no policies for cad-
mium reduction in place. Such an increase could be caused by a relative price decrease
of high-Cd phosphate rock resulting from the EU’s demand shift towards low-Cd rock.
However, given the minor (albeit not negligible) role of the EU as a player on the world
phosphate market, this impact will probably not be very substantial.
Another indirect impact could be an increase in the use of other kinds of fertilising prod-
ucts, such as manure or sewage sludge, induced by the relative price increase of (chemi-
cal) phosphate fertiliser. These products may contain a range of environmental contami-
nants, including cadmium28. The extent to which this effect will occur will probably be
limited, because the substitution elasticity between artificial and organic fertilisers is
quite low, because of agronomic limitations (e.g. the much more limited availability of
nutrients in manure, its variability in nutrient composition, and the fact that the propor-
tions of nutrients often do not match the requirements of the crops).
Finally, the shift in resource use could imply that the decrease in cadmium is accompa-
nied by an increase in other contaminants. According to Coster (1999), magmatic (low-
Cd) rock can contain other undesirable heavy metals. However, according to Kongshaug
HWDO (1992, cited in Mortvedt and Beaton, 1995) the contents of heavy metals in Russian
and South African phosphate rock are generally equal to, or lower than the average val-
ues in reserves elsewhere. Only the copper content in South African phosphate rock is
significantly higher.
5.5.2 ‘Decadmiation breakthrough’
In this scenario, the direct impacts in terms of a reduction of cadmium load to agricul-
tural soils in the EU are similar to those in the ‘low-Cd rock’ scenario if we assume that:
• the percentage cadmium reduction in the decadmiation process is the same as the av-
erage decrease in cadmium content in the ‘low-Cd rock’ scenario (90% in our exam-
ple);
                                                  
28 However, a reduction in Cd content of fertilisers will also reduce the Cd content of manure to
some extent, if the livestock is fed with domestic feedstuffs.
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• the cadmium content of phosphate rock used in the WPA process (with decadmia-
tion) remains the same (presumably 50 mg Cd per kg P2O5)
29;
• for phosphate fertilisers which are not produced by means of the WPA process,
phosphate rock is used with a reduced cadmium content, similar to that in the ‘low-
Cd rock’ scenario (presumably 5 mg Cd per kg P2O5).
The amount of cadmium in the phosphogypsum will be higher than in the former sce-
nario, because part of the cadmium is transferred to the gypsum before the decadmiation
of the phosphoric acid takes place.
In addition, decadmiation produces a by-product containing cadmium, which will usu-
ally have to be disposed of as hazardous waste30. The nature and amount of this by-
product depend on the specific decadmiation process. To the ‘CC’ decadmiation process
(co-crystallisation of cadmium with anhydrite) a concentration step can be added which
leads to the most concentrated and least toxic residue: cadmium metal itself (Davister,
1996).
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29 Nevertheless, as noted in Section 5.3.6, the “stringent” version of the charge may provide an
incentive to use phosphate rock with a low cadmium content, even if decadmiation takes
place.
30 We assume that the decadmiation is applied to phosphoric acid, not to phosphate rock (calci-
nation). In the latter case, the byproduct would be cadmium emissions to air.
$SRVVLEOH(8ZLGHFKDUJHRQFDGPLXPLQSKRVSKDWHIHUWLOLVHUV 
The assumed fact that decadmiation of phosphoric acid is the most efficient option to
produce low-Cd phosphate fertiliser may induce fertiliser producers to use the phospho-
ric acid route as much as possible. This means that the main alternative technology for
producing phosphate fertilisers, the ‘nitrophosphate’ route, will be much less applied.
The nitrophosphate production process (see Box 5.1) does not allow decadmiation: all
cadmium from the phosphate rock will end up in the fertiliser. The consequence of a
shift towards the wet process is that the amount of waste gypsum will also increase (the
nitrophosphate route does not produce waste gypsum).
%R[7KHQLWURSKRVSKDWHSURGXFWLRQSURFHVV
In the nitrophosphate (or ‘Odda’) process, phosphate rock is acidulated using nitric acid.
It has some advantages over the WPA process: it does not involve the use of sulphuric
acid (and hence does not lead to the production of waste gypsum), it uses its raw materi-
als almost completely, it can use lower quality phosphate rock and it is more flexible
with regard to water-soluble P2O5 in the product. However, in other respects it is less
flexible than the phosphoric acid route: it can only be used for NP and NPK types of fer-
tiliser (which have a relatively low P2O5 content), it leads to the production of high
amounts of  nitrofertilisers (AN and CAN), and the relatively complex process technol-
ogy requires a large-scale operation to be economic (EFMA, 1995b;  Demandt, 1999).
An environmental disadvantage is the emission of  NOx and the greenhouse gas N2O in
the production of the nitric acid. On the other hand, the (acidifying) emissions associated
with the production of sulphuric acid are avoided.
In Europe, some producers have switched to the nitrophosphate technology in response
to environmental pressures (e.g. Norsk Hydro in Porsgrun, Norway; BASF in Antwerp,
Belgium; and Chemie Linz in Austria) (Heerings, 1993).
Waste gypsum is already a significant environmental problem, because of the large
quantities involved31, its content of cadmium and other impurities, and its radioactivity.
Using the gypsum as a building material is not a solution, essentially for the same rea-
sons (there is simply too much of it, and it is contaminated). Other possible applications
of the gypsum are agricultural use (e.g. for rehabilitating saline soils and soils that have
been inundated with sea water), road building, and the enhancement of municipal waste
disposal in landfill (Demandt, 1999). Discharging phosphogypsum to water is still com-
mon practice, but it is considered not to be ‘Best Available Technology’ anymore (Cos-
ter, 1999). Land-based disposal methods are most common (Demandt, 1999).
The growth in waste gypsum production may accelerate the already ongoing trend to-
wards relocation of phosphoric acid production from the EU to the phosphate rock pro-
ducing countries, such as Morocco32. These countries usually have ample potential stor-
                                                  
31 Five tonnes of gypsum are generated for every tonne (P2O5) of product acid produced
(EFMA, 1995).
32 The number of wet-process phosphoric acid production sites in western Europe declined
from 45 in 1980 to 10 in 1994, and is still decreasing (Demandt, 1999).
,QVWLWXWHIRU(QYLURQPHQWDO6WXGLHV
age capacity for the gypsum, or they do not consider discharging the gypsum into the sea
to be a problem. Producers in these countries might also try to maximize the part of the
cadmium from the phosphate rock ending up in the gypsum, so as to minimize the Cd
concentrations in the phosphoric acid to be exported to the EU.
On the positive side of the environmental balance, a ‘spin off’ of decadmiation technol-
ogy to other parts of the world could be a long term effect, once the technology has
reached maturity (overcome growing pains, benefited from economies of scale etc.) and
the cadmium content of fertilisers is recognised as an environmental problem elsewhere
as well.
5.5.3 Conclusions
The primary environmental impact of the Cd levy in the ‘low-Cd rock’ scenario is a sub-
stantial reduction of cadmium loads to agricultural land in the EU (indicatively estimated
at 90%), as well as a reduction of cadmium discharges in phosphogypsum, both in the
EU and in other countries producing phosphoric acid33. These impacts are to be expected
if the ‘stringent’ version and the ‘uniform’ or the ‘minimum rate’ approach of the charge
is chosen. The ‘moderate’ version and the ‘divergent’approach will lead to similar, but
less pronounced results. The reductions come on top of the decrease in cadmium load
that can be expected as a result of lower rates of phosphate fertiliser use.
The ‘decadmiation’ scenario may have less favourable environmental outcomes than the
‘low-Cd rock’ scenario: no reduction and maybe even an increase in the amount of cad-
mium in waste gypsum, as well as the production of (more or less concentrated) cad-
mium waste, which will occur primariliy in the producing (developing) countries.
&RVWVRIDGPLQLVWUDWLRQDQGHQIRUFHPHQWUHYHQXHV
In the ‘uniform’ approach, only importers to the EU and producers within the EU have to
be charged. If a cadmium charge is levied in some Member States only (‘divergent’ ap-
proach), or at rates which differ by Member State (‘minimum rate’ approach), it will also
have to be levied from fertilisers which are traded between Member States. In those
cases, the number of chargepayers will be higher34. Moreover, in these cases additional
administrative costs are involved with reimbursements in cases where fertilisers on
which the charge has been paid are exported to another Member State.
In any of the approaches, national tax authorities will be responsible for collecting and
enforcing the charge. Administrative costs can be kept low by applying a system in
                                                  
33 This reduction of cadmium flows to agricultural soils can not be directly translated into a fig-
ure for the reduction of human cadmium uptake in food. There are large uncertainties con-
cerning the behaviour of cadmium in soils and plants. Moreover, the outcome will be de-
pendent on soil type, climate, crops and other factors.
34 In Sweden, there are 45 firms registered under the fertiliser tax, of which 5 import for their
own professional use, 37 import for resale and 3 manufacture in the country (Swedish EPA,
1997). If we extrapolate this figure to the EU level by dividing it by Sweden’s share in the
EU phosphate fertiliser use (1.24%), the number of taxpayers in the EU would amount to
some 3600. However, the actual number will be lower, because among the Swedish taxpay-
ers there are probably firms which only deal with nitrogen fertilisers.
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which registered firms are required to declare the amounts of chargeable fertiliser and
the cadmium content35 periodically. Checks can be incorporated in the general examina-
tion schedules of the tax authorities. Normally, administrative inspections (audits) should
be sufficient. Sample testing of actual cadmium contents can be limited to cases where a
suspicion of fraud exists.
A rough estimate of the administrative costs can be made on the basis of the following
assumptions:
• number of taxpayers: 1000 in the ‘uniform’ approach; 2000 in the ‘minimum rate’
approach and 1000 in the ‘divergent’ approach (where the number of participating
countries is lower);
• 1 person-year (valued at 50,000 EUR) is needed in the tax authorities to deal with
100  firms;
• administrative costs for firms are equal to those for the tax authorities.
The total administrative costs would then amount to some 1 million EUR in the ‘uni-
form’ and the ‘divergent’ approach and 2 million EUR in the ‘minimum rate’ approach.
The (gross) UHYHQXHV of the cadmium charge will depend on the approach and the ver-
sion of the charge as well as on the scenario. In the ‘uniform’ and the ‘minimum rate’
approaches and the ‘stringent’ version, the revenues (in EUR) are (at least) equal to the
amount of cadmium (in grammes) in phosphate fertiliser sold on the EU market. In Sec-
tion 5.5 these were estimated at 175 million in the ‘Business as usual’ scenario, and 14
million in the two other scenarios. In the ‘divergent’ approach and the ‘moderate’ ver-
sion, the revenues will be substantially lower. The exact level of revenues in the ‘diver-
gent’ approach will depend on the choices made by the participating Member States
(charge level and thresholds). In the ‘moderate’ version of the charge, revenues will de-
pend on the distribution of cadmium between below-threshold and above-threshold con-
centrations.
It can be concluded that in the ‘uniform’ or ‘minimum rate’ approach, combined with the
‘stringent’ version of the charge, revenues are likely to exceed administrative costs by a
wide margin, even if the charge effectively reduces the cadmium content of fertilisers.
Under the other charge options, positive net revenues are somewhat less certain.
                                                  
35 It is assumed that suppliers of phosphate fertilisers know the cadmium content of their prod-
uct. In some EU countries, such as Sweden and the Netherlands, monitoring the cadmium
content of fertiliser is already common practice. This practice should be extended to all
Member States applying the charge. Indeed, any policy aiming at a reduction of the cadmium
content would require such a monitoring system.
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6. Conclusions and recommendations
&RQFOXVLRQV
Cadmium from phosphate fertilisers poses a potentially serious threat to soil quality and,
through the food chain, to human health. The European Commission is considering the
possibility of using an EU-wide charge on cadmium in fertilisers so as to improve the
competitive position of the ‘low-Cd’ product YLVjYLV the ‘high-Cd’ one. The present
study aims at evaluating the economic and environmental implications of an EU wide
charge on the content of cadmium in mineral fertilisers, as well as the possibility and ef-
fects of an EU wide framework for charges, within which each Member State could set
its own rate.
The aim of the levy is to decrease the cadmium content of phosphate fertilisers, in order to
decrease the flow of cadmium to the soil. Three types of approaches are proposed:
• a ‘uniform’ approach, in which all Member States apply the charge at equal rates;
• a ‘minimum rate’ approach, in which all Member States apply the charge at a rate
equal to or higher than a specified minimum;
• a ‘divergent’ approach, in which the charge is applied in some Member States only,
at different rates.
Each of these approaches can be applied in a ‘moderate’ version (with a relatively low
(average) charge rate of EUR 0.25  per gramme Cd, thresholds and phasing), or a ‘strin-
gent’ version (charge rate at or around EUR 1.00 per gramme Cd; no thresholds or
phasing).
In the analysis, three scenarios are distinguished:
• µEXVLQHVVDVXVXDO¶ this scenario (which may prevail in the short term) implies a
lack of impact from the charge on supply and demand;
• µUXVKIRUORZ&GSKRVSKDWHURFN¶ in this scenario (which is the most likely one in
the medium and probably also in the long term), a massive shift in the use of raw
material takes place. Countries with vast reserves of low-cadmium phosphate rock,
such as South Africa and Russia, will become the EU’s main phosphate suppliers;
• µGHFDGPLDWLRQEUHDNWKURXJK¶ in this scenario (which may occur in the long term if
certain market and technological conditions are fulfilled),  decadmiation technology
is assumed to be used on a large scale.
At current prices and costs, using low-Cd phosphate rock is likely to be the preferred
strategy to be followed by fertiliser producers in response to the introduction of a cad-
mium charge in the medium and probably even in the long run. The reserves of low-Cd
phosphate rock are large, and it seems unlikely that they will be rapidly depleted, as con-
cern over cadmium in fertiliser is confined to the EU and some other rich countries.
However, some uncertainty remains on the question whether these reserves can be re-
garded as equivalent substitutes for the high-Cd rock that is being used presently.
The main HFRQRPLF impact of a cadmium levy will be a major shift of phosphate (rock,
but probably also acid and fertiliser) trade flows. In the ‘stringent’ version of the levy,
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South Africa and possibly Russia will probably become the main suppliers of the EU at
the expense of Morocco and other African countries.
If the introduction of a cadmium charge would lead to a transition towards decadmiation
of phosphoric acid, this could mitigate the adverse impact on the exports of countries
producing phosphate rock with a high cadmium content. However, such a transition is
only likely to take place if several conditions are fulfilled:
• the costs of decadmiation should substantially decrease and/or the charge rate should
be substantially higher than the assumed 1 Euro per gramme Cd;
• there should be a threshold concentration below which the charge does not apply (as
in the ‘moderate’ version);
• the cadmium concentration in the phosphate after decadmiation should be substan-
tially lower than the concentrations found in igneous (low-Cd) phosphate rock.
It seems questionable whether these conditions will easily be met in the foreseeable fu-
ture, even if the development of decadmiation technology is speeded up by massive fi-
nancial support from the EU and others.
Generally speaking, the introduction of a charge on cadmium in fertilisers will not have ma-
jor economic impacts on DJULFXOWXUH. The share of fertilisers and soil improvers in the total
costs of various farm types in the EU is usually (well) below 20%. As phosphate accounts
only for part of these costs, the cadmium charge (which will presumably increase the price of
phosphate fertiliser by some 10%) will in most cases lead to a cost increase for farmers of
less than 1%.
The primary HQYLURQPHQWDO impact of the Cd levy in the ‘low-Cd rock’ scenario is a
substantial reduction of cadmium loads to agricultural land in the EU (indicatively esti-
mated at 90%), as well as a reduction of cadmium discharges in phosphogypsum, both in
the EU and in other countries producing phosphoric acid. These impacts are to be ex-
pected if the ‘stringent’ version and the ‘uniform’ or the ‘minimum rate’ approach of the
charge is chosen. The other version and approach will lead to similar, but less pro-
nounced results.
The ‘decadmiation’ scenario may have less favourable environmental outcomes than the
‘low-Cd rock’ scenario: no reduction and maybe even an increase in the amount of cad-
mium in waste gypsum, and the production of (more or less concentrated) cadmium
waste.
The environmental and economic impacts of the Cd charge are in addition to the changes
which will occur as a result of other developments, e.g. the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP). Some of these developments will lead to a drop in fertiliser use, thus contributing
to the decrease in cadmium load to agricultural land. This ‘autonomous’ decrease in
cadmium load is, however, much smaller than the decrease that can be achieved through
the charge. It should be emphasised that, although the main conclusions are probably
quite robust, quantification of the impact of a cadmium charge is only possible within
relatively wide margins, given the uncertainties regarding a number of variables.
5HFRPPHQGDWLRQV
On the basis of our analysis, the following suggestions for the possible introduction of an EU
wide Cd charge can be made.
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First of all, the ‘ideal’ cadmium charge would have a regionally differentiated rate, because
of the variety in soil quality, sensitivity and background Cd concentrations in the EU. How-
ever, such a charge would be administratively unfeasible. It is therefore suggested to intro-
duce minimum charge rates at the EU level. Member States can choose to increase the rate
depending on the severity of the cadmium problem. This ‘minimum rate’ approach is better
able to reflect the differences of the problem between Member States than a uniform EU-
wide charge.
The levy revenues for each Member State will be relatively low. The aggregate maximum
for the EU as a whole can be roughly estimated at 175 million Euro in the (on the long term
unlikely) ‘Business as usual’ scenario under the ‘stringent, uniform’ charge option. It will be
much less in other options and in the two other, more likely, scenarios, where cadmium
contents are effectively reduced.In principle,  the net revenues of the levy could be recycled
to the sector paying them: industry and the farmers. Industry could be supported by R&D
funding for promising low-Cd fertiliser technologies. If these technologies include decadmi-
ation, special attention will be needed for the problem of safe disposal of waste products
containing cadmium. Farmers can receive support through awareness raising and training
programmes to optimise the use of (phosphate) fertilisers. However, since the net revenues
are expected to be low, due to the use of low cadmium fertilisers, it is questionable if such
earmarking makes much sense from an economic point of view. Nevertheless, revenue recy-
cling might enhance the acceptance of the charge.
Administrative costs should be minimised. In the ‘uniform’ approach, the charge can be lev-
ied from the relatively small number of producers and importers to the EU market. This also
makes the charge controllable and less sensitive to fraud. In the two other approaches, the
number of taxpayers is higher, as the charge has to be levied (and in some cases reimbursed)
on fertilisers traded between Member States as well. Thus, a compromise will have to be
found between low administrative costs and differentiation between Member States.
Preferably, the introduction of a charge on cadmium should be announced well in advance.
This would enable companies using high cadmium phosphate rock to switch to an alternative
and in this way a situation of comparative disadvantage for these producers could be
avoided. A (probably small) disadvantage of early announcement is the risk of traders or
farmers building up stocks of untaxed high-Cd fertiliser during the intermediate period.
The advantage of using a charge as the policy instrument is that companies can deter-
mine on an individual basis the optimum timing of the necessary investments, rather than
having to comply simultaneously and instantaneously with some mandatory maximum
cadmium concentration. This helps to avoid capital destruction.
The impact of the charge on North- and Central-African countries mainly exporting high
cadmium phosphate rock to the EU may need to be taken into account. It will be hard for at
least some of these countries to remain competitive under a cadmium charge, even if profit-
able decadmiation technologies become available. Applying a threshold for the cadmium
content (of say 20 mg Cd / kg P2O5) below which no charge is due could be helpful in this
case (although a threshold reduces revenues and is environmentally less advisable, because it
removes the incentive for continued Cd reduction). However, under a ‘low-Cd rock’ scenario
these countries will need assistance to find other export opportunities. Possible instruments
are the EU association treaties (for countries like Tunisia, Jordan, and Morocco) and the
Lomé Convention (for countries like Senegal, Togo and Nauru).
,QVWLWXWHIRU(QYLURQPHQWDO6WXGLHV
Finally, a cadmium charge implies the need to introduce a labelling system for P fertilis-
ers, specifying their cadmium content. Such a system might be introduced anyway, re-
gardless of the possible introduction of a charge. This would make farmers more aware
of the amount of cadmium they put on their land, which in itself could already create a
demand for low-Cd fertiliser.
The overall conclusion of the report is thus that an EU wide charge would in most op-
tions analysed have the effect of an increase in the demand for low-cadmium raw mate-
rial for the production of phosphate fertilisers for the EU market. The effects on the pro-
ducers of fertilisers would be limited if they were given sufficient time to prepare for the
charge. The effects on EU farmers would be small. The economic effects on some raw
material and fertiliser producer countries outside the EU could be significant.
The amount of cadmium put on EU soil would be considerably reduced. The cost-
efficiency would be high as large reserves of low-Cd rock are probably available at lim-
ited extra cost, and this rock can in most cases be used after a limited investment in up-
dating production facilities. In case of a breakthrough for decadmiation technologies, a
waste problem in the form of cadmium would occur in the fertiliser producing countries
with high Cd content in their raw material.
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Appendix I. Costs of low-Cd phosphate rock versus costs
of decadmiation
Decadmiation becomes profitable if the costs of this technology, together with the charge
to be paid on the remaining cadmium, are lower than the amount of cadmium charge to be
paid if no decadmiation takes place. We assume that the cost of decadmiation is partly a






Cd = the costs of decadmiation per tonne phosphate;
C0 = the fixed costs of decadmiation per tonne phosphate;
 WKHYDULDEOHFRVWVRIGHFDGPLDWLRQSHUJUDPPHFDGPLXPDQGSHUWRQQHSKRVSKDWH
Q = the cadmium concentration before decadmiation (in g Cd per tonne phosphate).
Decadmiation is then profitable if:
47474&
R
⋅>⋅⋅+⋅+ βα  (2)
in which:
T = the charge rate (in EUR per gramme Cd);
 WKHSURSRUWLRQRIFDGPLXPUHPDLQLQJLQWKHSKRVSKDWHDIWHUGHFDGPLDWLRQ









is fixed per tonne of P2O5 and does not depend on the cadmium concentration). In that








If there is a residual concentration of cadmium which is unrelated to the initial concentra-











Things become more complicated if we assume that the costs of decadmiation are not line-
arly related to the concentration of cadmium in the phosphate rock, but that they increase
more than proportionally with the degree of purification. A functional specification of the























It is also possible to calculate the maximum price difference between high-Cd and low-Cd
phosphate rock. This is given by:
**
max )( S447S +−⋅= (8)
in which:
pmax = the maximum price of low-Cd rock;
T = the charge rate;
Q* = the cadmium concentration at which decadmiation becomes profitable;
Q = the cadmium concentration of the low-Cd rock;
p* = the price of phosphate rock with cadmium concentration Q*.












increase for low-Cd rock is approximately equal to the cost of decadmiation.
$SRVVLEOH(8ZLGHFKDUJHRQFDGPLXPLQSKRVSKDWHIHUWLOLVHUV 
Appendix II. Fertilisers and other sources of cadmium:
quantities, abatement costs and charge rates
Phosphate fertiliser is not the only source of cadmium in the European environment. Hup-
pes HWDO (1992) estimated the total cadmium emissions in the (then) EU for 1987 at 2,467
tonnes per year. Of these emissions, 377 tonnes (15%) were directly related to the use of
commercial fertilisers, whereas another 175 tonnes (7%) were indirectly related to phos-
phate fertiliser (mainly phosphogypsum discharges). The contribution of phosphate fertil-
iser to the cadmium load of agricultural soils is generally larger than these percentages.
The figures presented by Folke and Landner (1996) suggest that this share may range be-
tween 15 and 75% of the total cadmium influx. Other important sources are atmospheric
deposition and manure.
The costs of cadmium emission reductions vary widely between different sources. Huppes
HWDO (1992) present cost figures ranging from 116 to 24,000 ECU per kg cadmium. The
estimated costs of phosphoric acid decadmiation used in our analysis (in the order of mag-
nitude of 1,000 ECU per kg cadmium; possibly lower) are in the lower part of this range.
One should keep in mind that not all cadmium emission reduction measures are equally
relevant for the influx of cadmium to agricultural soils. Most industrial discharges of cad-
mium to water and waste disposal, for example, will not contribute to the cadmium load on
farmland, and only part of the atmospheric emissions of cadmium will be deposited there.
Therefore, in terms of reducing the cadmium accumulation in agricultural soil,  the use of
low-cadmium fertilisers is likely to be a cost-effective measure36. However, if the objec-
tive is a JHQHUDO reduction in cadmium emissions to the environment, other measures (such
as substituting and/or recycling NiCd batteries and zinc) may be equally or more cost-
effective.
                                                  
36 Reducing excess fertiliser use and refraining from using manure, compost or sewage sludge
may be even more cost effective at the farm level.
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Appendix III. Fertiliser use in the EU: maps and graphics
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Mr. Coster’s general remarks were:
• Cd is just one element in the rock: especially low Cd rock, found in eruptive earth
crust, can contain other undesirable heavy metals;
• the rock is not selected on Cd content, but on phosphate content; a price difference is
therefor not based on Cd content.
• Also, in comparison to other sources, Cd from fertiliser is definitely not the only
source.
• Only a few European producers exist. Since the market is a commodity market, pro-
ducers do not have a dominant position and therefor they will not pass on the tax and
pay it out of their own pocket. However the margins are low due to excess supply
and competition from Eastern Europe.
• For TSP no substitute exists: so banning would not help. In amounts it is only a few
thousands tonnes TSP.
His remarks on the economic model were:
• the levy creates a rent for low cadmium phosphate rock: this premium can be seized
by the mining company/producer of phosphoric acid (outside the EU), the distributor
or the producer.
• The US uses low cadmium rock for their own production of fertiliser: so stocks
available for European demand are outside the US.
• Supply of low Cd rock: will mines be able to provide more rock on the market, or
will they raise prices, which is likely according to Mr. Coster, since there only few
suppliers.




Peter Botschek is Agricultural Engineer and Hans van Balken worked for DSM in the
technology and environmental safety department.
General remarks:
• Risk assessment study ERM for DG 3 nearly finished;
• Raw material situation: only one producer in EU: Kemira Finland that uses low Cd
rock; the waste gypsum is used to a small extend for plaster (background radiation is
a problem), most is waste.
• France and Spain are big importers of raw material: mostly phosphoric acid;
• relation with phosphate content and Cd content:
• high Ph - high Cd: this is usually sedimentary rock which is easy to process;
• low Ph - low Cd: volcanic rock, much more difficult to process (DSM developed
leaching technique, however it stopped producing fertiliser);
• Average Cd content: 71 mg / kg P2O5 for 91% of all phosphate rock fertiliser;
• Industry has proposed to EU to lower average Cd content to 60 mg/kg P2O5 on a vol-
untary bases; this standard was based on technology assessment
• OECD 1995 reports are still up to date for technology description;
Remarks on model:
• Fertiliser is a commodity market: competition is fierce: producers may pay for tax to
keep market share.
• Decadmiation technology still needs 5 to 10 years research: technical solution should
be possible;
• Low Cd rock is mainly available from South Africa and Russian Federation: attached





• AMFERT negotiates a voluntary agreement with the Netherlands Ministry of Hous-
ing, Spatial Planning and the Environment on decreasing the use of cadmium;
• Monitoring by AMFERT has shown that the use of cadmium has decreased by a
factor 3 to 4;
• Average cadmium content of fertilisers in the Netherlands: around 30 mg/kg P2O5;
Remarks:
• Since the operating margins are low, the cadmium tax will be passed on to the con-
sumer. The first reaction to a cadmium tax would be a shift to more low cadmium
phosphate rock. However, not all sources of low phosphate rock can be used, be-
cause of technical restrictions. Use of low phosphate rock is the only solution for su-
perphosphates, since decadmiation of the phosphoric acid is not possible. Unfortu-
nately, the magmatic phosphate rock (that usually has a lower cadmium content), can
not be used for production of superphosphates, only the sedimentary types: that
means only sedimentary low phosphate rock can solve the problem for superphos-
phates.
• Decadmiation technology can solve the problem for fertilisers based on phosphoric
acid: Mr. Langeveld’s estimate is a price increase of 8 to 10%.  Decadmiation how-
ever still has a cadmium problem: the cadmium will have to be retrieved from the
waste water flow and put into a special isolated landfill site, otherwise it will still
return to the environment;
• Therefore calcinating is not really solving the problem either: about 40% of the cad-
mium will be emitted into the air, together with carbon dioxide and other organic
elements.
• The export of (low) phosphate rock from the former Soviet states is entirely a ques-
tion of hard currencies: Mr. Langeveld estimates that if the economic situation im-
proves, agriculture in these countries will grow and more fertiliser will be produced
locally, which reduces the export;
• About NLG 80 million (EUR 36.3 million) was invested in the pilot on using phos-
phoric acid gypsum waste in construction. The annual gypsum production would be
around 1.5 to 2 million tons per annum, creating a large distortion in the market. Be-
sides, the investment is very high and KEMIRA (- and Norsk Hydro, but they are
quitting production-), the company that is performing the pilot, is seriously evaluat-
ing the pilot because doubts on the viability of the technique have come up, accord-
ing to Mr. Langeveld.
Suggestion:
• Since cadmium flows to the soil not only by mineral fertiliser but also by organic
fertiliser, these sources should also be taxed, from an environmental point of view
and based on the equity principle, if cadmium in fertiliser is to be taxed;
• Training farmers in optimising fertiliser application in combination with pH-





CAN calcium ammonium nitrate
CAP Common Agricultural Policy
CaSO4 calcium sulphate (gypsum)
CC co-crystallisation of cadmium with anhydrite (decadmiation process)
Cd cadmium
cif cost, insurance, freight
DAP di-ammonium phosphate
EFMA European Fertilizer Manufacturers(’) Association
EUR Euro
FADN Farm Accountancy Data Network
FAO Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations
FSU Former Soviet Union











SSP single super phosphate
TSP triple super phosphate
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
USD US dollar
VKP Vereniging van Kunstmest Producenten (Dutch Fertiliser Producers’ As-
sociation)
WPA Wet Process Acid
